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ABSTRACT
 In 1821, Judge Burrough famously described the public policy defense in contract law 
as a “very unruly horse.” To test this proposition, this Article presents the first systematic 
content analysis of public policy defense case law. The sparse previous literature and com-
mentaries on this defense, which relied on theory and leading cases, tend to accept the no-
tion that this area of contract law proves unruly. I reveal an underlying order that emerges 
from the ordinary run of public policy defense cases, rather than the leading cases.  
 An examination of opinions written in 2009 reveals that public policy defenses that spec-
ify a violation of a statute or regulation tend to be twice as successful than those that appeal 
broadly to public policy. Further, the employment of the defense can be segmented to show 
that the “unruly” cases only comprise one-third of the sample. These findings, among others, 
significantly cut the magnitude of the perceived “unruly horse” problem and should reframe 
our approach to the public policy defense. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
“When they argued this case . . . it was said there was no consider-
ation, and if there was it was illegal. . . . If it be illegal, it must be 
illegal either on the ground that it is against public policy, or 
against some particular law. I, for one, protest . . . against arguing 
too strongly upon public policy;—it is a very unruly horse, and
when once you get astride it you never know where it will carry you.
It may lead you from the sound law. It is never argued at all but 
when other points fail.” 1
 Judge Burrough’s enduring “unruly horse” metaphor for the public 
policy defense to contract2 appears in contract literature,3 in contract 
 1.  Richardson v. Mellish, (1824) 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303; 2 Bing 229, 251-52 (Bur-
rough J.) (emphasis added). As Percy Winfield wrote in 1928: 
That [horse] has proved to be a rather obtrusive, not to say, blundering, steed 
in the law reports. . . . And at times the horse has looked like even less accom-
modating animals. Some judges appear to have thought it more like a tiger, 
and have refused to mount it at all, perhaps because they feared the fate of the 
young lady of Riga. Others have regarded it like Balaam’s ass which would car-
ry its rider nowhere. But none . . . has looked upon it as a Pegasus that might 
soar beyond the momentary needs of the community.  
Percy H. Winfield, Public Policy in the English Common Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 76, 91 
(1928). 
 2.  Judicial invocation of public policy stretches across the common law. See Richard 
A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J. L. & ECON. 293 (1975); Hans A. 
Linde, Courts and Torts, “Public Policy” Without Public Politics?, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 821 
(1994). This Article limits the focus to contracts. 
 3.  See, e.g., John Shand, Unblinkering the Unruly Horse: Public Policy in the Law of 
Contract, 30 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 144 (1972). 
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treatises,4 and in case law.5 When a party asks a court to refrain from 
enforcing an otherwise valid bargain on the grounds that it would 
offend public policy, the party asks the court to do something out of 
the ordinary. Instead of requesting the court to apply a traditional 
common law defense, the court is being asked to discern public policy, 
or possibly pronounce public policy. This can compel a court’s reliance 
on statutes,6 regulations,7 prior case law proclaiming public policy 
serving as precedent,8 or as troublingly described by M.P. Furmston, 
reliance “on reasoning not convincingly or completely adumbrated.”9
 This Article tests the “very unruly horse” metaphor to see if the 
description remains valid wisdom nearly two centuries later. No ex-
isting contracts literature empirically evaluates the content of the 
cases involving the public policy defense in a systematic manner. I 
attempt to partially fill that gap in the literature here. I hope to con-
tribute to a more elegant structural understanding of the public poli-
cy defense by importing the case law as we find it, rather than by just 
providing a study of the “leading cases,”10 as some of the literature 
does. Essentially, this Article aims to provide another view of the de-
fense—a view based on what courts are routinely doing, not based on 
what the most famous or leading cases say or what the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts attempts to restate or prescribe. 
 Generally, I set out in this Article to find a simpler, more predic-
tive way of categorizing the cases—to address, among other ques-
tions, whether some types of a challenge to enforceability on public 
policy grounds were more successful than others and whether certain 
categories were more orderly or “unruly” than others. 
 4.  See, e.g., 15 GRACE MCLANE GIESEL, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: CONTRACTS CONTRA-
RY TO PUBLIC POLICY § 79.3, at n.2 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 2003); 5 SAMUEL WILLIS-
TON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 12:2 (4th ed. 2009); 
JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 22.1 (5th ed. 2003); E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 326 (3d ed. 1999). 
 5.  See, e.g., Blackburn & McCune, PLLC v. Pre-Paid Legal Svcs., Inc., No. M2009-
01584-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 2670816 at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2010); Giannecchini 
v. Hosp. of St. Raphael, 780 A.2d 1006, 1010-11 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2000); Official Comm. of 
Unsecured Creditors of Allegheny Health Educ. & Research Found. v. Pricewaterhouse-
Coopers, LLP, 989 A.2d 313, 330 (Pa. 2010); Penunuri v. Sundance Partners, Ltd., 257 P.3d 
1049, 1053 (Utah Ct. App. 2011); Seigneur v. Nat’l Fitness Inst., Inc., 752 A.2d 631, 641-42 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000).  
 6.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 7.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 8.  See infra Part IV.B.1-2. Or, in some cases, to infer no justification because of the 
absence of supporting sources. 
 9.  M. P. Furmston, The Analysis of Illegal Contracts, 16 U. TORONTO L.J. 267, 308 
(1966). 
 10.  As Allan Farnsworth noted, focusing on “leading cases” does not help doctrine 
develop, nor does it aid the advancement of scholarship. E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts 
Scholarship in the Age of the Anthology, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1406, 1462 (1987). Grant Gilmore 
also famously noted the consequences of this Langdellian tradition of using “leading cases” 
to paste together contract law. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 19 (Ronald 
K.L. Collins ed., 2d ed. 1995). 
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 After analyzing a consistent sample of public policy contractual 
defense cases, I conclude that Judge Burrough’s metaphorical horse 
is not uniformly “unruly”—categories of these cases can be discerned, 
and some categories appear more orderly than others. In this Article, 
I define these categories and provide some descriptions of cases with-
in each of them. Hopefully, this redefinition and proposed new 
framework for the defense can simplify our understanding of the de-
fense and at least point us in a clearer direction for its application.  
 To undergird my analysis, in Part II of the Article, I review some 
of the sparse literature and commentary on illegal contracts and the 
public policy defense, including the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts. In Part III, I set out the empirical agenda that I attempt to 
fulfill and the methodology I employed. I then discuss the outcome of 
the content analysis in Part IV, the categories of public policy cases 
that emerge, and examples of the cases that populate them. I also 
empirically describe the Restatement’s lack of efficacy in this area. In 
Part V, I briefly and modestly suggest some potential revisions to the 
description of and the approach to the public policy defense, in light 
of my core findings in Part IV. 
 Before delving into the details of my methodology and analysis, I 
highlight a few of the primary conclusions I reached. My refined 
sample of opinions reveals that roughly half (forty-eight percent) of 
the public policy contracts cases are resolved by invoking or looking 
to a statute or regulation. When the public policy defense invokes a 
statute or regulation it is almost twice as likely to be successful in its 
attack on the contract (fifty-nine percent of the time) than when the 
defense invokes mere case law or a broad, general appeal to public 
policy (thirty-one percent).11 These statutory/regulatory cases appear 
to follow a more direct path and could be described as “ruly.”12
 The defenses that employ broader appeals to general public policy 
tend to be less successful. Perhaps Judge Burrough’s observation in 
Richardson that the defense “is never argued at all but when other 
points fail,”13 merely reflected the lower rate of the defense’s success 
in this category. This basic distinction between the statuto-
ry/regulatory cases and the broader, general cases could be viewed as 
cutting the magnitude of the “unruly horse” problem at least in half. 
Some order can be drawn just in noting that invocation of the defense 
in these circumstances is substantially more likely to fail.  
 However, further distinctions can be made among even these gen-
eral public policy cases. For example, it seems that when the defense 
 11.  To be precise, 1.9 times more likely. 
 12.  I coin the term “ruly,” which is not an AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY word, to 
contrast with the world “unruly,” used in Richardson v. Mellish, (1824) 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 
303; 2 Bing 229, 251-52 (Burrough J.). 
 13.  Id.
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succeeds within the “broader appeal” to “general public policy” cate-
gory, courts often draw upon other case precedent that declares the 
public policy. These courts cite the public policy found by previous 
courts as they would common law—without any reference to a stat-
ute or regulation. This reliance on precedent brings a degree of order 
and legitimacy to the defenses that fit this category, rendering them 
only “somewhat ruly” in my framework. They remain “unruly” to a 
certain degree because the public policy findings in these cases are 
merely based on other judicial findings. 
 As I describe below, the remaining “unsuccessful” uses of the pub-
lic policy defense tend to be the “unruly” portion of the cases. I con-
tend that the unruliness of these cases should not prove completely 
disconcerting for those seeking order in this area, as they mostly  
appear to represent failed attempts to lure a court into discerning 
public policy where no public policy has been established through  
political means.  
 Taken together, my analysis of these sets of cases can lead to a 
more orderly framework for understanding them, as I illustrate in 
Figure 1. 
Figure 1
Percent of Total Public Policy Defense Cases by  
Type/Success (n = 103) 
Public Policy Defense Successful  Defense 
Unsuccessful  
Defense
Defense Rooted in Statute/ 
Regulation 48% 
Defense Rooted in General 
Appeal to Public Policy 15% 33% 
Hybrid of Both14 7% 
“Ruly” “Somewhat ruly” “Unruly” Other 
 Figure 1 depicts how often cases in the public policy arena tend to 
fall into the categories I have described. Under my framework,  
the truly “unruly” cases seem to present themselves only one-third of 
the time.  
 14.  I discuss the seven percent of cases that classify as “hybrids” of both categories of 
defense at Part IV.B.4 infra.
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 Before detailing my findings below, I explore the baseline of schol-
arship and conventional wisdom about the public policy defense to 
offer contrast to my approach and analysis. 
II. PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO ANALYZE THE PUBLIC POLICY DEFENSE
 Scholars have paid limited attention15 to the judicial invalidation16
of contracts17 on public policy grounds. Moreover, much of this atten-
tion was granted over forty years ago.18 Although the literature 
touches upon the role of judicially discerned public policy, both in 
contract and elsewhere in private law, very few scholars have focused 
purely on the public policy problem in contracts. As noted in the In-
troduction here, no systematic empirical efforts have been made to 
explore the nuances of the public policy defense. Only two compre-
hensive19 structural taxonomies of the defense have been presented 
over the past fifty years, and one of these was a note in the Harvard 
Law Review.20
A.   Formal Discussions in the Literature
 Aside from the taxonomies discussed in those two works, scholars 
have directed their efforts in the public policy arena to broader exam-
 15.  See Adam B. Badawi, Harm, Ambiguity, and the Regulation of Illegal Contracts,
17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 483, 488 (2010) (acknowledging that “commentary on this issue has 
been sparse” in light of the frequency with which the public policy defense seems to appear 
in contracts opinions). 
 16.  Though I use terms like “public policy defense,” “invalidation,” and even “attack” 
on a contract, I am always referring to enforceability in the public policy context. 
 17.  Note the term “contracts against public policy” presents an internal contradiction. 
See Juliet P. Kostritsky, Illegal Contracts and Efficient Deterrence: A Study in Modern 
Contract Theory, 74 IOWA L. REV. 115, 116 n.4 (1988). Contracts, by definition, are agree-
ments that carry legal obligations. Contracts voided on public policy grounds carry no legal 
obligations, therefore eviscerating their status as contracts. They are merely agreements. 
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981) (“A contract is a promise or a set of 
promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the 
law in some way recognizes as a duty.”); see also U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(12) (2007).  
 18.  See, e.g., Shand, supra note 3. Furmston’s 1966 article, supra note 9, and a law 
review note appear to be the only comprehensive formal scholarship exclusively directed to 
the breadth of the subject and the formulation of a framework for understanding the de-
fense. See Note, A Law and Economics Look at Contracts Against Public Policy, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 1445, 1446 (2006) [hereinafter A Law and Economics Look]. Some other older, but 
notable works include Winfield, supra note 1 (a compelling historical study of the under-
pinnings of public policy); George A. Strong, The Enforceability of Illegal Contracts, 12 
HASTINGS L.J. 347 (1961) (discussing a raft of then-recent California cases in an attempt to 
describe the defense in an uncertain zone of conflicting rules and exceptions); and John W. 
Wade, Restitution of Benefits Acquired Through Illegal Transactions, 95 U. PA. L. REV. 261 
(1947) (discussing the remedial challenges presented by different types of cases). 
 19.  In some instances, the public policy defense has been addressed within a narrower 
substantive category of cases. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy: The 
Case of Arbitration Agreements, 22 ST. MARY’S L.J. 259 (1990).  
 20.  See Furmston, supra note 20; A Law and Economics Look, supra note 18.  
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inations and justifications for the defense.21 In more recent instances, 
scholars have addressed the thorny problems of finding appropriate 
remedies22 and the role of the public policy defense in promoting effi-
cient deterrence of undesirable behavior.23 Others have focused their 
study more narrowly on a specific zone of the application of the de-
fense, attempting to illuminate the defense with specific subject mat-
ter.24 These contributions to the literature all loom large because of 
the sheer absence of commentary about this complex problem.  
 Because this Article’s goal is to develop a new taxonomy and a 
new predictive model for these cases based on a systematic study,  
I focus briefly on two articles that provided broad taxonomies  
to offer some contrasts with the approach I developed through a  
consistent observation. 
 1.   Furmston Taxonomy 
 In 1966, M.P. Furmston proposed, in perhaps the most compre-
hensive effort to taxonomize this defense in the scholarly literature, a 
scheme for understanding public policy cases in contract.25 He tried 
to address the gap in the literature left by commentators that tended 
to “overgeneralize the effect of cases” and “oversimplify the subject.”26
Furmston divided the cases into five classes: “contracts which are 
legal but whose enforcement is affected by considerations of public 
policy,”27 “contracts to do an improper act,”28 “contracts for improper 
trafficking in inaction,”29 “contracts with an improper tendency,”30
and, “contracts for the supply of materials for impropriety.”31 Even 
though the study is nearly a half-century old, Furmston’s effort re-
mains the most recent broad and extensive scholarly attempt to or-
ganize this defense.  
 21.  See Walter Gellhorn, Contracts and Public Policy, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 679 (1935); 
Winfield, supra note 1; Shand, supra note 3. Shand discerned three justifications for the 
defense—the punitive justification, the “pure fountain” justification, and the deterrence 
justification. The “pure fountain” interest describes a court’s unwillingness to enforce dirty 
agreements. Shand, supra note 3, at 148-57. 
 22.  See Wade, supra note 18; Badawi, supra note 15. 
 23.  See Kostritsky, supra note 17. 
 24.  See Dan L. McNeal, Judicially Determined Public Policy: Is “The Unruly Horse” 
Loose in Michigan?, 13 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 143 (1996) (an illustration of how the public 
policy defense has been applied in narrow private law areas within one state); Jeffrey W. 
Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy: The Case of Arbitration Agreements, 22 ST. MARY’S L.J. 
259 (1990) (using arbitration cases to illuminate the challenges presented by the public 
policy defense). 
 25.  See generally Furmston, supra note 9. 
 26.  Id. at 308. 
   27. Id. 
 28.  Id.
 29.  Id. at 308-09.  
 30.  Id. at 309. 
 31.  Id.
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 Stating modest goals, Furmston “sought [not] to give a definitive 
account of illegal contracts but [only] to explore more closely certain 
aspects of the topic.”32 He attempted to remedy the “overgeneraliza-
tion” of commentators who had addressed this subject, with a new 
categorization scheme accompanied by case analysis.33 Furmston cau-
tioned that his ultimate classifications were “still tentative” and ad-
mitted that “it may be that further analysis will reveal other classes” 
because his exploration only involved analysis of the “leading cas-
es.”34 In the decades that followed his publication, nobody appears  
to have taken Furmston’s invitation to look further in the broad way 
he had. 
 Furmston’s tentative classification, however, though a notable 
step forward in a dark area, could not offer a complete description of 
the landscape of public policy cases precisely because it was based on 
the “leading cases,” rather than the ordinary.35 Moreover, Furmston 
set out to uncover more classes of cases when perhaps a better under-
standing of the defense required something other than a more de-
tailed classification. As I describe below, the commentators and the 
Restatement of Contracts seemed to accomplish this end, albeit provid-
ing limited value for developing a broader theory of the defense. 
 The Furmston scheme was never tested to see if it would help ex-
plain or predict the case law in this uncertain area. In an area of law 
compared to an unruly animal, unsurprisingly, few cases can be 
found that truly lead. Certain public policy cases are famous, like the 
gestational surrogacy contracts opinions in the Baby M case36 and 
Johnson v. Calvert.37 But these cases are often better used to trigger 
debate about how to think about the limits of freedom of contract 
than to explain how courts will address public policy defense cases that 
present more routinely.  
 2.   Law and Economics Taxonomy 
 More recently, a Harvard Law Review note served to support a 
law and economics justification for “void for public policy” doctrine—
that is, the public policy defense.38 The taxonomy used for that pur-
 32.  Id. at 308. 
 33.  Id. Furmston comes close to apologizing for not offering more than this, but his 
scheme is nonetheless a major contribution and the most robust framework in the litera-
ture. Id. 
 34.  Id.
 35.  Id.
 36.  In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) (invalidating gestational surrogacy con-
tracts on public policy grounds). 
 37.  851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (holding that gestational surrogacy cases do not violate 
public policy). 
 38.  See A Law and Economics Look, supra note 18, at 1446. The note concluded that 
“[w]elfare-minded judges making decisions under the [void against public policy] doctrine 
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pose divided the cases into four distinct categories that cast the cases 
by the nature of the contract at issue—whether the contract was to 
commit an act “definitely against public policy,”39 to “refrain from 
acts that further public policy,”40 to “commit legal acts that them-
selves facilitate acts against public policy,”41 and to perform acts with 
uncertain public policy effects.42
 Although this taxonomy admirably attempted to impose order on 
the field through the lens of another discipline, ultimately, a portion 
of decisions could not be effectively predicted and categorized by this 
scheme. The last category, agreements to “perform acts with uncer-
tain public policy effects,” appeared to stump the authors.  
 What should a court do when the acts to be performed will have 
“uncertain public policy effects”? The answer seems to elude a com-
plete solution from a law-and-economics approach, as exemplified in 
the note’s struggle to find a clear solution for handling indemnity 
clauses.43 As noted in the content analysis in Part IV, indemnity and 
exculpation (and limitation and shifting of damages generally) prove 
fertile grounds for the public policy defense.44 Failure to satisfactorily 
explain this subject matter leaves a hole in this approach, even 
though the rest of the analysis makes a contribution.45
 Both of these categorization approaches built their foundations on 
exemplary cases, rather than a straightforward survey and evalua-
tion of cases coming through the system. This leaves room for explor-
ing the latter approach.  
                                                                                                                  
must consider a wide variety of factors, paying attention to, among other things, the possi-
bility of overdeterrence, the relative cost of contractual nonenforcement versus direct pun-
ishment of the underlying activity, and the parties’ relative levels of knowledge. The prob-
lem’s complexity in turn demands that courts applying the doctrine take a systematic, ex-
plicit approach, as only then can there be any hope that they will appropriately balance the 
interests inherent in the decision.” Id. The note suggested “a tentative law and economics 
taxonomy for the field, discuss[ed] potential reasons to enforce contracts despite their neg-
ative externalities, and consider[ed] ramifications of potential remedies [in order] to take a 
first step toward solidifying that approach.” Id. In summary, the note identified the messi-
ness of the contracts and public policy area and attempted to use law and economics to 
illuminate the problem in an attempt to organize it. Id.
 39.  Id. at 1449. 
 40.  Id.
 41.  Id.
 42.  Id. at 1458-60. 
 43.  Id.
 44.  In my sample, twenty-nine percent of the cases involved some flavor of addressing 
whether an exculpatory or indemnity clause was valid. I later categorize these as “agree-
ments that limit or shift liability” or “damage limitation” cases. See infra Table 2.  
 45.  The damage limitations cases I studied appear to be explained by whether the 
clause runs contrary to a statute or regulation or whether it does not. A thorough law-and-
economics analysis of these cases would prove fruitful, but the predictive factor seems to be 
quite basic. 
572 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:563 
B.   Treatises and Commentary 
 Because the academic literature is somewhat sparse, a brief scan 
of the treatises and commentaries can provide some insight into the 
way cases involving this defense have been ordered. The major treatises 
provide extensive categorization schemes for the application of the 
defense. The schemes are driven both by subject matter of the  
underlying contract (Corbin most extensively does this) and by the 
nature of the relationship between the illegal act and the contract, which 
Williston attempted.  
 Though these categories and catalogues provide excellent descrip-
tions of the application of the defense, they do not offer a robust pre-
dictive framework for where the defense will likely be more success-
ful and where it might be more orderly. Williston suggests that if a 
bargain comports with the “modern view” of the successful public pol-
icy defense (essentially the balancing/weighing test also expressed in 
the Restatement), the contract will be held unenforceable.46 (Given 
Williston’s role in drafting the first Restatement of Contracts, one 
would expect this convergence of approach.) 
 As I note in my discussion of the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts in Part IV.B, I found in my examination of the cases that 
courts rarely put the Willistonian “weighing/balancing” approach into 
practice. The treatises and commentary provide a solid descriptive 
foundation of the case law and commentary about the public policy 
defense, but they leave room for more and better ordering. They are 
worth noting because their approach seems to embody much of the 
established wisdom about the defense—that it is indeed “unruly,” 
and difficult to summarize doctrinally. 
 For example, the Corbin treatise’s treatment of the public policy 
defense is exhaustive and almost scientific in the way it catalogued 
every identifiable species and subspecies of the defense. It leaves the 
impression that the defense is dependent on the minutiae of every 
conceivable underlying subject matter addressed in a public policy 
case. Corbin also expressly and appropriately concedes the difficulty 
of discerning public policy.47
 46.  See 5 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 4, § 12:1, at 744-52. 
 47.  15 GIESEL, supra note 4, at § 79.3 (“Courts often use the two alliterative words 
‘public policy’ as if they had a magic quality and were self-explanatory. . . . But judges also 
have the job of evaluating public policy even in the absence of such sources. The entire 
body of what is described as the common law is the result of innumerable court decisions 
based upon the judicial notions of sound social policy and human welfare. In situations in 
which the legislature has not spoken on an issue, or in situations in which the legislature 
has been unclear, or in situations in which there are, perhaps, inconsistent statements by 
the legislature, how does a court determine whether a contract contradicts public policy? 
The difficulty of the court’s task has long been recognized.”) (emphasis added).
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 In his survey of contracts found to violate public policy, Corbin 
detailed twenty-six different types of “contracts in restraint of compe-
tition,”48 seven types of “contracts involving familial relationships,”49
three types of “Sunday contracts,”50 eighteen “bargains harmful to 
the administration of justice,”51 nine “bargains harmful to the public 
service or to the performance of [a] fiduciary duty,”52 nineteen “bar-
gains to defraud or otherwise injure third persons,”53 twenty-two dif-
ferent types of “wagering bargains,”54 fifteen types of “usury bar-
gains,”55 and nine “miscellaneous bargains contrary to public poli-
cy.”56 Corbin’s treatise reads a bit like Charles Darwin’s The Zoology 
of the Voyage of H.M.S. Beagle,57 counting 128 different subspecies of 
the public policy defense in action. Though, in some sense, Corbin’s 
work could prove to be a helpful guide to those trying to identify if a 
certain defense had been employed before, it does not provide any 
sense of the frequency with which these cases are pled, nor does it pro-
vide us with a sense of where courts are more likely to void a contract.  
 Corbin contributes a concrete descriptive structure, but he also 
attempts to provide predictive help in one section of his treatise by 
noting that there may be distinctions between contracts that involve 
conduct that is malum in se versus conduct that is malum prohibi-
tum.58 Even there Corbin acknowledges that “many judges have said 
that the distinction between contracts relating to malum in se
conduct and contracts relating to malum prohibitum conduct has 
been ‘exploded.’ ”59
 Though organized differently, the Williston treatise provides a de-
tailed analysis of the public policy defense and offers some broad 
guidance about the situations where one could expect the defense to 
succeed—and does not go far beyond that point.60 The treatise makes 
a concededly broad claim that:  
 48.  Id. § 80. 
 49.  Id. § 81. 
 50.  Id. § 82. These contracts are a leftover from an era when the law in some states 
prohibited business transactions on Sunday. 
 51.  Id. § 83. 
 52.  Id. § 84. 
 53.  Id. § 85. 
 54.  Id. § 86. 
 55.  Id. § 87. 
 56.  Id. § 88. 
 57.  See, e.g., 4 CHARLES DARWIN, THE WORKS OF CHARLES DARWIN, THE ZOOLOGY OF 
THE VOYAGE OF H. M. S. BEAGLE, PART I: FOSSIL MAMMALIA, PART II: MAMMALIA (Paul H. 
Barrett & R.B. Freeman eds., N.Y. Univ. Press 1987) (1839). 
 58.  15 GIESEL, supra note 4, § 79.5.
 59.  Id.
 60.  5 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 4, § 12:1, at 742 (“[I]n this treatise, the appropri-
ate inquiry is limited to determining in what cases and to what extent the law denies, for 
reasons of public policy, to technically complete bargains, the usual characteristics of con-
tractual obligations and legal force.”). 
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[A] bargain will be declared illegal or unenforceable if:  
1. The consideration for a promise in it is an illegal act or forbear-
ance;  
2. It is illegal to make some promise in the bargain, even though 
what is promised might be legally performed;  
3. Some performance promised is illegal;  
4. A provision is included for a condition in violation of law; or  
5. According to the modern view, embodied in the Restatement  
Second, “the interest in enforcement [of a promise or term] is  
clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against 
the enforcement of such terms,” in which case the term will  
be unenforceable.61
 Though this categorization scheme is more abstract, Williston 
(like Corbin) also provides extensive lists of examples62 of the “vari-
ous foundations of public policy,”63 and the “[l]imits of judicial recog-
nition of public policy.”64 Like other treatises, however, it does not 
provide a census that reveals the frequency of the subject matter of 
the cases or which flavors of the defense are more successful. The 
treatise does enter into some discussion of the first and second Re-
statements of Contracts, discussing where the Restatements work 
well and where it does not, also using anecdotal descriptions.65 (As I 
note in Part IV.B below, the role of the Restatement is minimal to-
day.) Though mentioning the “ ‘unruly horse,’ ”66 Williston did not 
attempt to tame it within the confines of his treatise. 
 The hornbooks, in pursuit of the simplicity that is their purpose, 
also seem to accept the unruly horse metaphor. Calamari and Perillo 
explicitly refrained in their hornbook from claiming that they were 
offering a comprehensive view of the “various kinds of contracts or 
contract clauses that have been struck down on grounds of public pol-
icy.”67 The authors focused instead on the consequences of an agree-
ment struck down on this basis68—a valuable contribution, but one 
that leaves readers bereft of an analysis of the scenarios that lead to 
these consequences.  
 The treatises and commentaries can be bolstered by a complete 
discussion of the defense as actually employed today, informed by 
 61.  Id. at 744-52.  
 62.  It could be characterized as a carefully-crafted laundry list, though Williston does 
not appear to be as comprehensive as Corbin. 
 63.  Id. § 12:2, at 687. 
 64.  Id. § 12:3, at 858. 
 65.  Id. § 12:4. 
 66.  Id. § 12:2, at 776 (quoting Richardson v. Mellish, (1824) 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303; 2 
Bing 229, 252 (Burrough J.)). 
 67.  PERILLO, supra note 4, § 22.1, at 843. 
 68.  Id. 
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case law.69 After briefly discussing the Restatement, I attempt to 
supplement the traditional analysis of the defense with a systematic 
view of what types of claims succeed more often—and where there 
might be other meaningful distinctions between these types of cases. 
C.   Restatement of Contracts 
 As noted, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, section 178(1), 
suggests that courts should “weigh” or balance factors that are more 
expressly delineated in subsections (2) and (3). 
§ 178. When a Term is Unenforceable on Grounds of Public Policy  
(1) A promise or other term of an agreement is unenforceable on 
grounds of public policy if legislation provides that it is unenforce-
able or the interest in its enforcement is clearly outweighed in  
the circumstances by a public policy against the enforcement of 
such terms. 
(2) In weighing the interest in the enforcement of a term, account 
is taken of  
 (a)  the parties’ justified expectations,  
 (b)  any forfeiture that would result if enforcement were denied,  
 (c) any special public interest in the enforcement of the particu-
lar term. 
(3) In weighing a public policy against enforcement of a term, ac-
count is taken of  
 (a) the strength of that policy as manifested by legislation or 
judicial decisions,  
 (b) the likelihood that a refusal to enforce the term will further 
that policy,  
 (c) the seriousness of any misconduct involved and the extent to 
which it was deliberate, and  
 (d) the directness of the connection between the misconduct and 
the term.70
 To contextualize this “weighing” approach, the Restatement lays 
out a specific list of the bases of public policies against enforcement, 
one which is more specific, detailed, and content-driven than concep-
tual.71 The Restatement recognizes that public policy can be raised by 
 69.  Id. Calamari and Perillo focused on executory bilateral contracts, id. § 22.2; licens-
ing statutes (as this Article does), id. § 22.3; the remoteness of the illegality, id. § 22.4; 
fiduciaries, id. § 22.5; divisibility, id. § 22.6; restitution, id. §§ 22.7-22.8; change in law or 
facts after the bargain (this Article discusses a case in this category, infra pp. 57-59, Lucky 
Jack’s Entm’t Ctr. v. Jopat Bldg. Corp.), id. § 22.9; and with some specificity, illegal attor-
ney agreements, id. § 22.10. 
 70.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981) (emphasis added). 
 71.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 179.  
Bases Of Public Policies Against Enforcement  
A public policy against the enforcement of promises or other terms may be de-
rived by the court from  
(a) legislation relevant to such a policy, or  
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legislation, “the need to protect some aspect of the public welfare, as 
is the case for the judicial policies against, for example . . . restraint 
of trade[,] . . . impairment of family relations[,] . . . [and] interference 
with other protected interests.”72 These bases are all folded into the 
more elaborate balancing tests that cover all other situations that 
arise with public policy.73
 The Restatement framework, however, does not aid much with 
broader categorization or predictability. As I describe in Part IV.B, 
courts rarely cited Restatement section 178 in the set of cases that I 
examined and they rarely applied the conceptual “weighing” ap-
proach, which raises questions about its utility. In an “unruly” area, 
one would expect courts to seek refuge in some source of authority. 
The Restatement does not provide that authority in practice nor does 
it appear to reflect the manner in which today’s courts handle cases. 
 To test the usefulness of the Restatement, and to test the other 
conventional wisdom about the defense, I describe the mechanism I 
devised to isolate a consistent set of relevant public policy cases in 
Part III. In order to discern any order out of the public policy defense, 
the run of cases must be examined closely, which I do in Part IV. 
Though efforts have been made, as I have just noted, to categorize 
cases conceptually in some effort to bring order to the defense, no 
scholar has done so by looking at the problem from the bottom up. 
Before analyzing the public policy defense cases, I set out first to 
identify them. 
III.   THE PUBLIC POLICY DEFENSE AS EMPLOYED
 A content analysis of recent cases involving the public policy de-
fense to a contract reveals that this public policy problem might ap-
pear to be a slightly more “ruly” horse than Judge Burrough posited. 
No previous scholarship has attempted systematically to sift through 
                                                                                                                  
(b) the need to protect some aspect of the public welfare, as is the case for the 
judicial policies against, for example,  
  (i) restraint of trade 
  (ii) impairment of family relations, and  
  (iii) interference with other protected interests.  
For more detail on restraint of trade, see id. §§ 186-88, for family relations, see id. §§ 189-
91, and for “other protected interests,” see id. §§ 192-96, 356. See also id. § 181. “Effect Of 
Failure To Comply With Licensing Or Similar Requirement.” Related sections of the first 
Restatement addressed bargains to “Refrain From Committing a Wrong,” RESTATEMENT 
(FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 578 (1932), “Bargains Concerning Domestic Relations,” id. §§ 581-
89, and “Bargains Tending to Defraud or Injure Third Persons,” id. §§ 571-79. 
 72.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 179. 
 73.  See id. § 178(1).  
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public policy cases to examine their content.74 A number of questions 
remain extant, however. With what relative frequency does the pub-
lic policy challenge involve the violation or contravention of an estab-
lished regulation or statute as opposed to a generalized call to pre-
vent an odious public consequence of enforcement? Do courts go 
through the weighing and balancing exercises suggested by the Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts, section 178?75 How often does this 
defense succeed and does it succeed in certain contexts more than 
others? This Article sets out to answer these questions and others by 
evaluating and categorizing six months of cases from 200976 in every 
United States jurisdiction that could be deemed as a pure challenge77
to a contract on public policy grounds. 
 The identification of cases involving the public policy defense re-
quired the casting of a wide net in order to be inclusive and then the 
application of a tight sorting process to purify the set of judicial opin-
ions to ensure that they were relevant to the analysis.78 The goal was 
to produce a consistent set of cases that addressed the defense apart 
from separate and distinct doctrines, as I explain. First, I searched 
for opinions in the “All Federal & State Cases” Westlaw database for 
a six-month period ranging between July 1, 2009, and December 31, 
2009, in order to capture activity in courts of all levels in every juris-
diction. The search terms used within this database were “contract & 
‘public policy’ & defense.” This broad query within a large base of 
cases returned a total of 1,089 opinions, mostly unpublished opinions. 
I also used the search term “illegal contract” within the same 
timeframe. This “illegal contract” search yielded only sixty opinions, 
a few of which overlapped with the primary search.  
 I read all of the opinions to determine if they met certain, specific 
criteria to qualify for analysis as a “pure” public policy defense case. 
For a case to qualify for analysis, the opinion had to (a) involve a con-
tractual issue, (b) address and (c) resolve the public policy defense. 
With respect to (c), included is the notion that courts can sua sponte 
 74.  I accepted David Snyder’s invitation to “go out and look” at the cases. David V. 
Snyder, Go Out and Look: The Challenge and Promise of Empirical Scholarship in Con-
tract Law, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1009, 1016 (2006). 
 75.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1) (“A promise or other term of an 
agreement is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if legislation provides that it is 
unenforceable or the interest in its enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances 
by a public policy against the enforcement of such terms.”). 
 76.  Published and unpublished within the Westlaw database. This project commenced 
in earnest in mid-2010, so these dates presented a logical starting point. 
 77.  See infra this Part for an explanation of what I deemed to be a “pure challenge.”  
 78.  My simplified approach was heavily, but not exclusively, influenced by the basic 
techniques discussed in ROBERT M. LAWLESS, JENNIFER K. ROBBENOLT & THOMAS S. ULEN,
EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW (2010) (describing methods in data gathering and evaluation) 
and in Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opin-
ions, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 63 (2008) (discussing the empirical method of content analysis). 
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address illegality or public policy concerns and invalidate a contract, 
the justification being that parties mutually involved in illegal activi-
ty may not have the incentive to plead the defense—and that the 
public good must nonetheless be served.79 I included unpublished 
(and even modified and overruled) opinions in my final analysis be-
cause my objective was to get a solid cross-sectional view of how the 
defense is really used in action. I was not concerned about the prece-
dential value of these cases—nor was I concerned with what might 
have happened to these specific cases on appeal. I intended to review 
a consistent set of opinions from a defined period of time that would 
demonstrate how courts handle the defense at every level, every day, 
from barebones, unpublished state trial court opinions to elaborate, 
published federal appellate opinions. 
 Additionally, to further distill the set of cases, I removed opinions 
that litigated public policy in the context of arbitration,80 restraint of 
trade,81 noncompete agreements,82 choice of law questions,83 and em-
ployment discharge challenges.84
 79.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, ch. 8, topic 1, intro. note (1981) (“Even if 
neither party’s pleading or proof reveals the contravention [of public policy], the court may 
ordinarily inquire into it and decide the case on the basis of it if it finds it just to do so, 
subject to any relevant rules of pleading or proof by which it is bound.”). 
 80.  For descriptions of the distinct flavor of public policy in the arbitration zone see, 
for example, Harvey R. Boller & Donald J. Petersen, Applying the Public Policy-Exception 
to Labor Arbitration Awards, 58 DISP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2003-Jan. 2004 at 14, 16; Christo-
pher S. Gibson, Arbitration, Civilization and Public Policy: Seeking Counterpoise Between 
Arbitral Autonomy and the Public Policy Defense in View of Foreign Mandatory Public 
Law, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1227, 1230-31 (2009); Paul F. Kirgis, Arbitration, Bankruptcy, 
and Public Policy: A Contractarian Analysis, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 503, 503 (2009), 
and Jeffrey W. Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy: The Case of Arbitration Agreements, 22 
ST. MARY’S L.J. 259, 263 (1990). The United States Supreme Court addressed the public 
policy defense and enforceability in E. Associated Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers, 531 U.S. 57, 
61-67 (2000). Justice Thomas also addressed the defense in the context of the Federal Arbitration 
Act in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 1740, 1753-56 (2011) (Thomas, J., concurring.). 
 81.  The Restatement notes that restraint-of-trade cases are well-established in com-
mon law and statute. These cases have a life apart from plain-vanilla public policy defense 
cases. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 8, topic 2, intro. note:  
  The common law’s policy against restraint of trade is one of its oldest and 
best established. Nevertheless . . . , that policy is severely circumscribed . . . . 
. . . Although activities such as organizing a corporation or refusing to deal with 
another may be in restraint of trade, they are outside the scope of this Re-
statement if no promise is involved. . . However, a promise to organize a corpo-
ration or to refuse to deal comes within its purview.  
  [Also,] the Restatement does not deal with those aspects of the subject that 
are largely legislative. . . . Promises in restraint of trade are governed by exten-
sive federal and state statutes, under which the promise may not only be unen-
forceable, as at common law, but may give rise to both civil and criminal re-
sponsibility. The substance of that legislation is beyond the scope of this Re-
statement. With respect to most aspects of the restraint of trade, federal legis-
lation has so completely occupied the field as to make the common law rules of 
little or no consequence except as they may give meaning to some of the more 
general terms of that legislation. Examples are the creation of monopoly, the 
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 In each of these cases, I justified the exclusions on the judgment 
that the jurisprudence appeared to be especially dominated by the 
substantive subject matter, leaving less room for judicial discretion 
than in other public policy defense cases.85 For example, the  
challenges to arbitration clauses and enforcement of arbitration decisions 
are strongly tied to interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act, which 
effectively declared a national public policy.86 The use of the term “public 
policy” extends over a range of cases involving contractual enforcement.  
 I attempted to isolate the cases to yield opinions where courts 
wrestle with pure public policy defenses that stand apart from any 
other doctrine.87 Certainly, different selection criteria and categories 
                                                                                                                  
substantial lessening of competition by, for example, tying purchases of one 
product to another, or the imposition of non-ancillary restraints controlling 
prices or limiting production. Specific aspects of the subject may also be gov-
erned by state statutes. 
 82.  The Restatement places these cases within the public policy bucket, but they also 
have a distinct flavor by profession and by jurisdiction. The noise within this bucket would 
overpower any insights from the “pure cases.” See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 
186(2) (“A promise is in restraint of trade if its performance would limit competition in any 
business or restrict the promisor in the exercise of a gainful occupation.”). But these cases 
tend to follow different policy lines in different professions, like law and medicine. See Rob-
ert Steinbuch, Why Doctors Shouldn’t Practice Law: The American Medical Association’s 
Misdiagnosis of Physician Non-Compete Clauses, 74 MO. L. REV. 1051, 1051 (2009). Also, 
the cases tend to be enforced differently in (1) different industries (see, e.g., Emily E. Duke, 
Mary M. Krakow & Sarah M. Gibbs, Creating Enforceable Noncompete Agreements with 
Bank Officers and Other Key Employees, 126 BANKING L.J. 248, 250 (2009)); (2) states (see, 
e.g., John M. Norwood, Non Compete Agreements in Arkansas: Can They Be Enforced?,
2009 ARK. L. NOTES 141 (2009); Kevin R. Eberle, Eroding Disfavor of Non-Competes and 
the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine in South Carolina, S. C. LAW., Nov. 2008 at 13, 13)); and 
(3) at the intersection of states and industries (see, e.g., Melissa Ilyse Rassas, Comment, 
Explaining the Outlier: Oregon’s New Non-Compete Agreement Law & the Broadcasting 
Industry, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 447, 447-48 (2009) (discussing a new Oregon law that revised 
the approach to noncompetes within the broadcasting industry in that state)). 
 83.  For a comprehensive set of examples that demonstrate that these cases are often 
decided on issues unique to choice of law, apart from plain public policy, see Symeon C. 
Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2010: Twenty-Fourth Annual Survey,
59 AM. J. COMP. L. 303, 355-58, 364-79, 389 (2011). 
 84.  Challenges on public policy grounds to at-will employment terminations focus on 
the public policy implications of the discharge, not the underlying contract. See, e.g.,
Strozinsky v. Sch. Dist. of Brown Deer, 614 N.W.2d 443, 447 (Wis. 2000). 
 85.  See infra Part V.B. for further discussion of the role of judicial discretion in appli-
cation of the public policy defense. 
 86.  Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2011). In Southland Corp. v. Keating,
465 U.S. 1 (1984), Chief Justice Burger interpreted § 2 of the Act to mean that Congress 
had established national public policy in this arena. Id. at 10 (“In enacting § 2 of the feder-
al Act, Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of 
the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting 
parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.”). This declared public policy would cloud any 
analysis of how courts make these decisions when there is no such bold declaration (by 
statute or by the Supreme Court) on point. 
 87.  I did, however, include examples involving unlicensed contractors, even though 
they may have a flavor of their own, as I discuss in Part IV.A.1. There is not a separate 
doctrine per se that covers these cases, but they do nicely and neatly embody statuto-
ry/regulatory conflict with a private bargain.  
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of cases could be justified for an analysis of the public policy defense 
like the one I present here. For other purposes, choices of inclusion 
and exclusion could be adjusted to either expand or restrict the scope 
of what I examined. This analysis aspires to serve as a point of de-
parture for different approaches with different purposes. 
 After completing the process I devised for selecting cases, I identi-
fied 103 opinions from this period at the state and federal level that 
met the criteria.88 Though the sample I used here may be slightly 
smaller when compared with similar studies,89 some definitive con-
clusions can still be drawn with statistical significance.90 The sample 
affords a valid description of the defense as modernly litigated. 
 With this data set in place, I set out to find whether there was or-
der to be found within these cases. Was this “horse” as “unruly” as 
Judge Burrough and subsequent scholars and judges believed? Were 
there different breeds of horses that were more “unruly” than others? 
Given that there has not been a systematic look at these cases, this 
Article attempts to answer those questions in a modest, directional 
way by examining a slice of them. 
IV.   CONTENT ANALYSIS OF CASE LAW
 I set out to evaluate the set of opinions that I had isolated to see if 
any patterns emerged that could enable ordering of a defense labeled 
“very unruly.” The first question I raised and addressed was how of-
ten the public policy defense was successful when pled and resolved. 
In the cases examined, the underlying contract was successfully at-
tacked in 46 out of 103 instances. (Put another way, this constitutes a 
forty-five percent success rate for the public policy defense in “void-
ing” the contract.) Given that this defense to contract worked roughly 
half of the time, we can assume that this is a vibrant defense to con-
tract enforcement when raised. In the aggregate, however, this find-
ing does not answer the question about whether “unruliness” is the 
norm in this corner of contract doctrine. 
 88.  Within this sample, no appeals appeared of cases decided within this short 
timeframe. 
 89.  Robert Hillman built his well-known study of promissory estoppel on 362 cases. 
See Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the “New Consensus” on Promissory Estoppel: An Em-
pirical and Theoretical Study, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 580, 582-83 n.15 (1998). One other recent 
study of promissory estoppel analyzed 383 cases. See Marco J. Jimenez, The Many Faces of 
Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical Analysis Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
57 UCLA L. REV. 669, 687 (2010). A study of unconscionability used a data set of 187 cases, 
a number in the neighborhood of this study of the public policy defense. See Larry A. Di-
Matteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of Unconscionability: An Empirical Study of 
Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1067, 1092-93 (2006). 
 90.  As discussed infra Part IV, note 91, the sample in this Article provides enough 
data to yield statistically-significant results at the level of distinguishing the outcomes 
between defenses rooted in statutes and regulations and defenses rooted in broader ap-
peals to public policy. 
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 At a summary level, the content analysis revealed a significant dif-
ference in outcome between cases that invoked a statute or regulation 
as the basis for the public policy defense and cases that invoked a 
broader public policy claim. Additionally, the cases in both categories 
almost unanimously avoid any balancing of interests, as suggested by 
the Restatement, in the analysis that leads to the outcome. 
I first separated the cases into two categories. Although categorizing 
cases can be a challenging and subtle exercise, a sizable number of 
these cases can be cast as attacks based on the underlying agreement’s 
contravention or undermining of a statute or regulation. The remain-
der of the cases can be classified as an attack on the contract based on 
broader, more general public policy grounds and interests. Comparing 
these two categories reveals a primary distinction that may help bring 
some order to an understanding of the public policy defense. Where an 
attack on a contract is based more closely on contravention of a statute 
or regulation, the contract appears more likely to fall victim to the at-
tack. In such cases, we find that there is success with the public policy 
gambit nearly twice as frequently than with the broader cases.91
Table 1
Success of Defense by Category of Defense 
Category of Public 
Policy Defense to 
Contract92
Total 
Cases 
“Successful”    
Cases (Where   
defense succeeds) 
Success 
Rate 
Defense Rooted in 
Statute/Regulation 49 29 59% 
Defense Rooted in 
General Appeal to 
Public Policy  
49 15 31% 
Hybrid of Both 5 2 40% 
Total 103 46 45% 
 91.  When the “hybrid” cases are stripped out, we see that the differences in result 
between statute/regulation and broader public policy are statistically significant. Running 
a chi square test, the two variables are not independent. X2 = 8.08425, DF=1, p=0.004465.  
 92.  Cases that presented a hybrid defense were categorized into statute/regulation or 
broader public policy if they leaned heavily in one direction or the other. Those that fit into 
neither category were determined to be hybrids. 
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A.   Contravention of Statutory/Regulation Cases 
 As I describe below, the statutory and regulatory contravention 
cases run the gamut from the government voiding an agreement 
forged through bribery of an undercover agent to parties trying to 
collect on a bargain for services provided by them without legally re-
quired licensure. As noted above, but worth emphasizing again be-
cause of the primacy of this finding, the public policy defense to con-
tract appears to be roughly twice as successful in this context.  
 Methodologically, I include in this category public policy opinions 
that involve a statute or regulation and reference it as the source of 
the public policy. In these cases, the public policy is constructed 
through a political process,93 not an adjudicative process. In my de-
scriptions of these cases, which immediately follow, I only include 
public policy defenses that prove successful because, in these cases, 
the court would be compelled to perform a more complete public pol-
icy analysis.94 To provide a flavor of the defense in action, I describe 
some licensure cases, then some cases that involve a criminal statute 
and, finally, cases that involve agreements to limit or shift liability 
(e.g., exculpatory clauses). Table 2 breaks down the cases involving 
agreements that contravene statute or regulation. 
 93.  Or “nonjudicial” process. I categorize regulatory cases as political. 
 94.  In analysis of the broader category of cases, I do describe unsuccessful attempts to 
invoke the defense because unsuccessful attempts dominate that category. 
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Table 2 
Success by Type of Defense Involving Contravention of  
Statute or Regulation 
Direct Contraven-
tion of Statute/ 
Regulation Cases 
Total Cases “Successful” Cases 
Success 
Rate 
Agreements Counter 
to Licensure or Code 12 9 75% 
“Criminal  
Agreements” 7 4 57% 
Agreements That 
Limit or Shift  
Liability 
12 7 58% 
Other 18 9 50% 
Total Direct Contra-
vention of Statute/ 
Regulation95
49 29 59% 
 1. Contracting Counter to Licensure 
 A common circumstance where the public policy defense is in-
voked involves scenarios where a service of value has been provided 
to the defendant but the service was performed in contravention of a 
code, or more commonly, the work was performed without proper li-
censure. Even though these opinions have their own distinct flavor, 
in some respect like the arbitration or restraint of trade cases, I in-
clude them because they embody a frequent public policy defense 
that cleanly invokes the argument that enforcement of the contract 
runs contrary to statute.  
 The licensing cases directly raise two important issues. First, 
should a court enforce a contract when a party performs an obligation 
but fails to comply appropriately with statutory or regulatory licens-
ing requirements? Second, how should courts balance the tension be-
tween upholding the public policy purpose of a statute with inflicting 
significant forfeiture on the unlicensed party? These questions cut to 
the core of what courts must encounter when handling the public pol-
 95.  One case is counted in both the “illegal” and “contravention of statute/regulation” 
categories. 
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icy defense in a scenario where a statute or regulation expressly 
speaks to the problem. 
 During the time period of the search, twelve licensure opinions fell 
into this category—contracting counter to regulation or code. The de-
fense to contract enforcement succeeded in nine of these cases. 
Though this study does not have enough data to fully confirm this, a 
strong hypothesis would lie in that these cases are especially “ruly.” 
The more granular separation of cases displayed in Table 3 shows 
that the defense in this context stands apart, even from the other 
cases that contravene statutes and regulations. 
Table 3 
Separating Licensure/Code Cases from Other Direct  
Contravention Cases 
Direct Contraven-
tion of Statute/ 
Regulation 
Total Cases “Successful” Cases 
Success 
Rate 
Agreements  
counter to  
licensure or code 
12 9 75% 
Other direct  
contravention of 
statute/regulation 
37 20 54% 
Total  49 29 59% 
 Section 181 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (“Effect of 
Failure to Comply with Licensing or Similar Requirement”) purports 
to address these circumstances.96 Though not frequently cited by 
name,97 the spirit behind this section of the Restatement appears 
 96.  This section provides:  
 If a party is prohibited from doing an act because of his failure to comply 
with a licensing, registration or similar requirement, a promise in con-
sideration of his doing that act or of his promise to do it is unenforceable 
on grounds of public policy if  
 (a) the requirement has a regulatory purpose, and  
  (b) the interest in the enforcement of the promise is clearly out-
weighed by the public policy behind the requirement. 
 97.  As of June 11, 2011, Westlaw only counted forty-four total historical case citations 
or mentions—and none within the timeframe of the case search I conducted. One reason for 
the paucity of citations to section 181 might lie in the fact that the licensing statutes often 
speak explicitly to contract enforceability questions and parties and courts plead “public 
policy” as a defense, quickly pointing to the relevant statutory text—not the Restatement. 
2012] BRINGING ORDER TO CONTRACTS 585 
very much alive and remains a vibrant basis for a defense to contract. 
The public policy defense to contract that invokes a failure to comply 
with licensing appears to succeed quite often.98 I also include similar 
cases that appear to invoke compliance with a regulation or code.99
The balancing test suggested by section 181(b) (that an agreement 
will be unenforceable if the “interest in . . . enforcement is . . . clearly 
outweighed by the public policy . . . .”) does not seem to be explicitly 
or implicitly invoked in the cases I examined. Courts appear to undo 
bargains directly and with little hesitation when this particular 
species of the public policy defense is raised, often, but not always, 
eschewing quasi-contract remedies. With this category—and with 
others—I try to inject some vibrancy into the analysis by providing 
descriptions of some of the successful invocations of the defense, as the 
judicial reasoning tends to be more explicit in these circumstances. 
 (a)   Halpern v. Greene
 A colorful example of the public policy defense in action was de-
scribed in an unpublished opinion from a lower court in New York. In 
Halpern v. Greene,100 a boxer, Greene, challenged the enforceability of 
a personal services management agreement the boxer had struck 
with two managers.101 The managers, unlicensed as boxing managers 
by the state of New York, were trying to collect on the agreement, 
claiming that a valid contract existed.102 Over time the managers had 
paid for thirteen of the boxer’s first fourteen fights, including expens-
es relating to travel, promotion, and publicity providing the purses 
for the boxers.103 The managers invested significant effort through 
contacts and negotiations to enable Greene to achieve “a Top Ten 
World Ranking,” while attempting to cut deals with major promoters 
                                                                                                                  
See, e.g., Davis Moreno Constr., Inc. v. Frontier Steel Bldgs. Corp., No. CV-F-08-854 
OWW/SMS, slip op. (E.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2009). 
 98.  See, e.g., id.; KLW Enters. v. W. Ala. Commercial Indus., 31 So. 3d 136 (Ala. Civ. 
App. 2009); Mousa v. Saba, 222 Ariz. 581 (Ct. App. 2009); Balt. St. Builders v. Stewart, 975 
A.2d 271 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009); Webb ex rel. Webb v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 218 P.3d 
1239 (Nev. 2009) (finding in part that unlicensed provision of services amounting to prac-
tice of psychology were not enforceable in contract); Talented IT, Inc. v. Data Grp., Inc. No 
L-10232-07, 2009 WL 3488465 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct 28, 2009); Halpern v. Greene, 
No. 108302/2008, 2009 WL 2972386 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 15, 2009).  
 99.  Often, these cases involve construction and compliance with permits and building 
codes. See, e.g., White v. Cridlebaugh, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 434 (Ct. App. 2009); Mid-Ohio 
Mech., Inc. v. Eisenmann Corp., Nos. 07 CA 000035, 08 CA 00012, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. 
Nov. 2, 2009) (involving unsuccessful challenge to contract using this flavor of the public 
policy defense where the court would not permit unknowing subcontractor to fall victim to 
general contractor’s failure to license). 
 100.  Halpern, 2009 WL 2972386. 
 101.  Id. at *1-3.  
 102.  Id. at *3.  
 103.  Id. at *2.  
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to get Greene into televised matches.104 The managers also procured 
Greene a $1000 per week contract for the boxer to spar with another 
boxer.105 According to the pleadings, “[a]s a result of plaintiffs’ efforts, 
Greene . . . remained undefeated and rose quickly in the boxing 
community, which resulted in his ranking as one of the top ten box-
ers in the Middleweight Division.”106
 The agreement laid out a structure for how Greene would be com-
pensated, and that the managers would receive one-third of the box-
er’s income plus reimbursement for expenses relating to travel and 
training.107 Ultimately, the promoters would invest $225,000 in  
Greene’s career.108
 The defendants (Greene’s father was also a defendant)109 chal-
lenged the management agreement on the basis that the plaintiffs 
were not licensed as promoters, managers, or matchmakers pursuant 
to the authority of the New York State Athletic Commission.110 The 
defendants also argued that “[e]ven if all proper licenses [were] se-
cured, the regulations do not recognize any management contract 
between a boxer and a manager as valid, unless both parties appear 
at the same time before the Commission and receive its approval,”111
pursuant to the New York state regulation on boxer-manager con-
tracts.112 Given that the managers failed to meet the requirements of 
this regulation, the court was left with no choice but to find the man-
agement services contract invalid. The court also noted:  
The state regulation of boxing parallel[ed] the federal legislation 
encapsulated in the Professional Boxing Safety Act, . . . [which] 
emphasize[d] the importance of state regulation of boxing to safe-
guard “the welfare of professional boxers and serve the public in-
terest.” Both the state and federal regulation of boxing was adopt-
ed not as revenue generating measures, but solely for the purpose 
of uprooting entrenched repeated occurrences of disreputable, co-
ercive and abusive business practices in the boxing industry.113
Taken altogether, the court refused to enforce the management 
agreement in contract because it ran against the public policy of 
 104.  Id.
 105.  Id.
 106.  Id.
 107.  Id. at *1 n.1. 
 108.  Id. at *2.  
 109.  After his son started to enjoy some success under the direction of the plaintiffs, 
the father began to insert himself as a manager. Id.
 110.  Id. at *3.  
 111.  Id. at *4.  
 112.  N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 19, § 208.5 (2012) (“A contract is not valid be-
tween manager and boxer unless both parties appear at the same time before the commis-
sion and receive its approval unless otherwise directed or authorized by the commission. A 
copy of all boxer-manager contracts must be filed with the commission for approval.”). 
 113.  Halpern, 2009 WL 2972386.  
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New York and the United States as expressed through a state and 
federal statute and regulation. Despite this clarity of result on the 
challenge to the contract, however, the court welcomed an alterna-
tive argument in quasi-contract.114
 Ultimately, the Halpern court would not permit the boxer to use 
the public policy defense as the proverbial sword rather than a 
shield.115 The court refused to dismiss the managers’ claim for unjust 
enrichment, leaving open the possibility for the managers to recoup 
“direct financial contributions which are separate and apart from any 
earnings Greene . . . may have made.”116 Drawing from New York 
case law, the court noted that “fee forfeitures are disfavored and 
that such forfeitures are perhaps particularly inappropriate when 
other regulatory sanctions exist for noncompliance.”117
 In sum, the court refused to enforce an agreement that directly 
contravened a statutory/regulatory scheme. But the Halpern court 
was nonetheless willing to entertain a claim outside of contract that 
would soften the justice of the result. As I explain, courts, however, 
are not generally this forgiving to those who form agreements that 
similarly run contra to a statute involving a licensing requirement. 
 (b)   Ron Medlin Construction v. Harris
 In Ron Medlin Construction v. Harris, the Court of Appeals of 
North Carolina decided a construction case involving, at its essence, 
an agreement between a general contractor and two individuals for 
whom the contractor had built a home.118 At the time the parties en-
tered into the agreement, the plaintiff contractor was unlicensed.119
After completion of the construction of a home valued at $1,300,000—
and after payments from the defendants to the plaintiff of $725,000, 
a dispute arose over the remaining balance owed to the contractor-
plaintiff. The defendants successfully maintained that they did  
not owe any additional money in contract because the contractor  
was unlicensed.120
 This court, however, in contrast to the Halpern court in New York, 
would not permit the contractor to pursue a separate cause of action 
from the once unlicensed contractor based on implied contract or 
quantum meruit. This court characterized the agreement at issue121
 114.  Id. at *6-7. 
 115.  Id. at *7.  
 116.  Id.
 117.  Id. at *5 (citing Benjamin v. Koeppel, 85 N.Y.2d 549, 553 (N.Y. 1995)). 
 118.  Ron Medlin Constr. v. Harris, 681 S.E.2d 807 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009). 
 119.  Id. at 808. 
 120.  Id. at 810-11.  
 121.  As one might expect with construction disputes, the case involved a set of agree-
ments and relationships between multiple subcontractors, the individual general contrac-
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as an “express contract”122 between the general contractor and the 
defendants.123 The Ron Medlin Construction court held that because 
the subject matter of the express agreement was essentially the same 
as the subject matter of the quantum meruit claim,124 the latter claim 
was equally invalid.125
 The court looked toward a North Carolina Supreme Court deci-
sion, Brady v. Fulghum,126 for a rationale for prohibiting recovery in 
any form for unlicensed contractors on public policy grounds. The 
Brady court explained, with citations to Corbin’s treatise: 
[W]hen a legislature invokes its police power to provide statutory 
protection to the public from fraud, incompetence, and irresponsi-
bility, as ours has done with the contractor licensing statutes, 
courts impose greater penalties on violators. Making contracts un-
enforceable by the violating contractor produces “a salutary effect 
in causing obedience to the licensing statute.” These public policy 
considerations militate against permitting unlicensed general con-
struction contractors to enforce their contracts. Denying the  
contractor the right to enforce his contract effectuates the statuto-
ry purpose and legislative intent of providing the public with  
optimum protection.127
 The Ron Medlin Construction court took a completely different 
turn than the Halpern court on the quantum meruit question. The 
court saw no sense in allowing the plaintiffs to achieve through quan-
tum meruit what they could not achieve through a contract that vio-
lated public policy—it would frustrate the same policy interests.128
 This result stands apart from the Halpern court’s desire to avoid a 
forfeiture, though a distinction could be made on the basis that con-
tractor licensing goes much more toward the essence of a safety poli-
cy. The Ron Medlin Construction court acknowledges the drastic im-
plications of the outcome of this case: “If this result seems harsh, our 
                                                                                                                  
tor, and his intertwining partnerships. This summary boils down the facts to the essence of 
the public policy dispute. 
 122.  The description of this arrangement as a “contract” again runs contrary to the 
language of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981): “A contract is a promise or a 
set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which 
the law in some way recognizes as a duty.” In this instance, the court afforded no remedy, 
even if there was a breach. 
 123.  Ron Medlin Constr., 681 S.E.2d at 810. 
 124.  The court so held even though the party making the claim was Ron Medlin Con-
struction, not George Ronald Medlin, individually. George Ronald Medlin was unlicensed 
when he entered into the agreement and the court was not willing to allow him to evade 
the licensing issue by transferring the agreement to Ron Medlin Construction. Id. at 810-
11.
 125.  Id.
 126.  308 S.E.2d 327 (N.C. 1983). 
 127.  Ron Medlin Constr., 681 S.E.2d at 810 (citations omitted) (citing Brady, 308 
S.E.2d at 331). 
 128.  Id. at 811. 
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Supreme Court in Brady has already observed: ‘If, by virtue of these 
rules, harsh results fall upon unlicensed contractors who violate our 
statutes, the contractors themselves bear both the responsibility and 
the blame.’ ”129 The North Carolina courts viewed this harsh result as 
necessary for perpetuation of the regulatory scheme and for protect-
ing the public. 
 Although there seems to be “ruliness” within this category in 
terms of declining to enforce contracts that run against licensure, as 
reported in section 181 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
how “ruly” are the actual results when factoring in other avenues 
for recovery? Are plaintiffs frequently permitted by courts to make 
end-runs that permit quantum meruit?
 Though I do not have a sample size to make an absolute conclu-
sion, a few states apparently take different postures toward contracts 
with unlicensed contractors, notably California, which provides not 
just a shield from enforcement of a contract by unlicensed contrac-
tors, but also a statutory sword that enables service recipients to dis-
gorge any money conveyed to unlicensed contractors.130 The Halpern
case enabled the unlicensed parties to recover in quasi-contract, but 
in the eight other cases where a public policy defense succeeded be-
cause the court found that a party ran afoul of licensure,131 no recov-
ery outside of contract was permitted.132 This would offer support for a 
hypothesis that the defense proves especially effective in this context. 
 (c)   Baltimore Street Builders v. Stewart
 The public policy defense can occasionally have the harsh effect of 
shutting out the unlicensed provider from any recovery. In Baltimore 
 129.  Id. (citing Brady, 308 S.E.2d at 332). 
 130.  See Davis Moreno Constr., Inc. v. Frontier Steel Bldgs. Corp., No. CV-F-08-854 
OWW/SMS, 2009 WL 1476990, at *20 (E.D. Cal. May 26, 2009) (comparing California’s 
approach (allowing for disgorgement of moneys from unlicensed contractors) with Colora-
do’s approach (absence of state-level licensing requirements and no allowance for dis-
gorgement)); White v. Cridlebaugh, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 434, 442-44 (2009) (citing CAL. BUS.
& PROF. CODE § 7031(a) (West 2009) (“[N]o person engaged in the business or acting in the 
capacity of a contractor, may bring or maintain any action, or recover in law or equity in 
any action, in any court of this state for the collection of compensation for the performance 
of any act or contract where a license is required.”)) (demonstrating application of  
the shield).  
 131.  See Davis Moreno Constr., Inc., 2010 WL 4513388; KLW Enters. v. W. Ala. Com-
mercial Indus., 31 So.3d 136 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009); Mousa v. Saba, 218 P.3d 1038 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2009); White, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 434; Balt. St. Builders v. Stewart, 975 A.2d 271 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009); Webb, ex rel. Webb v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 218 P.3d 1239 
(Nev. 2009); Talented IT, Inc. v. Data Group, Inc., 2009 WL 3488465 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. Oct. 28, 2009); Ron Medlin Constr., 681 S.E.2d 807.  
 132.  In Mousa v. Saba, unjust enrichment was forbidden for services relating to the 
licensed activity of real estate brokerage, but the court left open a possibility for recovery in 
unjust enrichment for other services. See Mousa, 218 P.3d at 1043. 
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Street Builders v. Stewart,133 nearly half of the balance that would 
have been due to the unlicensed contractor was left unpaid. The Bal-
timore Street Builders court explained the justification for the harsh 
result by ultimately appealing to section 598 of the Restatement 
(First) of Contracts, comment a: “The court’s refusal [to enforce the 
agreement] is not for the sake of the defendant, but because it will 
not aid such a plaintiff.”134 Explaining the logic for not permitting any 
recovery in quasi-contract, “ ‘the contention that there is unjust en-
richment of the defendants [is un]tenable. To permit a recovery on a 
quantum meruit would defeat and nullify the statute.’ ”135
 This corner of the public policy defense seems to be well-ordered, 
even within the more measured context of defenses that are based on 
a statute or regulation. As I describe next, the justifying theme of 
Baltimore Street Builders, namely that courts refrain from enforce-
ment of an illegal contract regardless of the equities, echoes in other 
applications of the defense beyond the licensing cases. Courts do not 
want to reward any parties that enter them, they wish to deter un-
lawful behavior, and they simply recoil from using power to enforce  
something impure. 
 2.   Criminal Agreements 
 The purest form of a public policy defense case would be one 
where a court refuses to enforce a contract because it promotes the 
violation of a criminal statute. Pure versions of this phenomenon are 
difficult to find for good reason. A “contract killer” would need to 
muster a certain amount of nerve to collect an unpaid bill for a mur-
der he successfully committed, using the public courts as the mecha-
nism. I did identify several cases that did involve contracts that 
brushed up against public interests expressed through criminal stat-
utes. Though there is no significant difference between the outcome 
of these cases and other cases within the agreements that “run con-
trary to statutes and regulations” category, they are prominent 
enough to examine. Note that the term “illegal contract” is often used 
broadly136—here, we are specifically focused on the use of the public 
policy defense in the context of a criminal statute. 
 133.  975 A.2d 271. 
 134.  Id. at 278 (quoting Thorpe v. Carte, 250 A.2d 618, 622 (Md. 1969)). 
 135.  Id. (quoting Harry Berenter, Inc. v. Berman, 265 A.2d 759, 763 (Md. 1970)). 
 136.  For example, the court in Lindmark v. Heuer, No. B205788, 2009 WL 3355098 
(Cal. App. Ct. Nov. 3, 2009), used the term “illegal contract,” but the alleged “illegal” act 
runs afoul of the California State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct, not a statute—or even 
a criminal statute. Note that though the Restatement (First) of Contracts (see, e.g., §§ 580, 
597, 598) uses illegality in its headers, the drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts do not. See PERILLO, supra note 4, § 22.1. The language often continues to slip be-
tween illegality and some form of violation of public policy. Calamari & Perillo use the title 
“Illegal Bargains” but appear to use it synonymously with other commentators’ approach to 
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 Out of the forty-nine opinions involving contractual contravention 
of a statute or regulation, seven could be deemed to involve criminal 
statutes in some way, directly or indirectly.137 Within these seven 
criminal contracts cases, four agreements were successfully attacked. 
Though this presents a small sample, a description of a few of the 
successful defenses sheds light on what happens in this zone.  
 (a)   Kardoh v. United States
 One of the oddest factual situations involving a criminal statute 
was taken to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Kardoh v. United 
States.138 Syrian national Abdul Masih Kardoh found himself caught 
in a federal sting operation. He paid $40,000 to an undercover agent 
in exchange for alien registration cards for people who were not per-
mitted to enter the United States.139 Kardoh was deported but never 
prosecuted.140 Despite admitting to the undercover agent that he 
knew what he was doing was illegal,141 Kardoh demanded his money 
back from the government.142 The district court agreed with Kardoh 
that he was entitled to the return of his property under F.R.C.P. 
41(g).143 On appeal, the government successfully argued that the un-
derlying contract was illegal and that Kardoh should not be able to 
get his money back—in spite of the fact that he had not been convict-
ed of any crime.144
 The Ninth Circuit, drawing upon an in pari delicto rationale, de-
termined that the government should keep the $40,000.145 Quoting 
United States v. Farrell,146 the court noted: 
It has long been the settled rule that property delivered un-
der an illegal contract cannot be recovered back by any par-
ty in pari delicto. The general rule, in its full Latin glory, is 
“in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis,” or “[i]n case 
                                                                                                                  
the public policy defense. Id. at § 22. The language tends to be slippery, but the intended 
meaning with respect to the defense appears similar with either set of words. 
 137.  Because of the overlapping nature of the issues in these cases (for example, insur-
ance coverage relating to criminal acts), some of these “criminal” illegal contracts can also 
be categorized elsewhere. 
 138.  572 F.3d 697 (2009). 
 139.  Id. at 698. 
 140.  Id.
 141.  Id. at 699. 
 142.  Id. at 698. 
 143.  Id. at 699-700. Rule 41(g) provides that “[a] person aggrieved by an unlawful 
search and seizure of property or by the deprivation of property may move for the proper-
ty’s return.” Id. at 699 n.1.  
 144.  Id. at 700. 
 145.  Id. at 698.
 146.  606 F.2d 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
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of equal fault the condition of the party defending is the  
better one.”147
 In essence, the court held that in a case like this, the court was 
not going to intervene to shift money or property around: “ ‘[I]t is con-
trary to public policy to permit the courts to be used by the wrongdo-
er [] to obtain the property he voluntarily surrendered as part of his 
attempt to violate the law.’ ”148 One scholar described this as the 
“pure fountain” justification for the public policy defense.149 Put 
simply, the court does not want to enforce sordid bargains, and this 
notion seems to permeate all of these cases. 
 The Kardoh court noted that the in pari delicto approach was orig-
inally used to prevent funds used to bribe public officials to be re-
turned to the briber,150 and was later applied to illegal transactions 
like buys of controlled substances from undercover officers before 
statutes existed to specifically provide for a forfeiture.151 I categorize 
the Kardoh case as a criminal statutory case because, ultimately, the 
public policy question focuses on preserving the interest that the 
criminal statute was advancing. Even though there was an absence 
of statutory law on the direct point of the forfeiture, the nature of the 
transaction and its relationship to criminal illegality was the focus of  
the court. 
 Of note here is that even in a seemingly simple case, courts look 
closely to see where property should ultimately lie—and implicitly 
consider whether a public court should be used as an instrument to 
order the movement of property in these circumstances.152 Ultimate-
ly, defenses to contract often force courts to consider the wisdom  
of using their public coercive power to move property around.  
Where the subject matter is “illegal,” courts seem less inclined to sul-
ly their prestige.153
 147.  Kardoh, 572 F.3d at 700 (quoting id. at 1348 & n.21) (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted). One can see how this maxim also implicitly applied to the licensing cases.
 148.  Id. at 701 (quoting Farrell, 606 F.2d at 1350). 
 149.  See Shand, supra note 3, at 148-57. 
 150.  Kardoh, 572 F.3d at 700. 
 151.  Id. at 701. 
 152.  See, e.g., id. at 699-701. This is consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s 
summary of these basic principles in Gibbs & Sterrett Mfg. Co. v. Brucker, 111 U.S. 597, 
601 (1884) (“The ground upon which courts have refused to maintain actions on contracts 
made in contravention of statutes for the observance of the Lord’s day is the elementary 
principle that one who has himself participated in a violation of law cannot be permitted to 
assert in a court of justice any right founded upon or growing out of the illegal transaction.”). 
 153.  See A Law and Economics Look, supra note 18, at 1449 (“As Lord Chief Justice 
Wilmot wrote in Collins v. Blantern, 95 Eng. Rep. 847, 852 (K.B.1767), ‘no polluted hand 
shall touch the pure fountains of justice. Whoever is a party to an unlawful contract, if he 
hath once paid the money stipulated to be paid in pursuance thereof, . . . you shall not have 
a right of action when you come into a Court of Justice in this unclean manner to recover  
it back.’ ”). 
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 (b)   Lucky Jack’s Entertainment Center v. Jopat Building Corp.
 Among true private parties (as opposed to contracts between un-
dercover agents and their dupes), the underlying purpose of a con-
tract might support an illegal activity, giving a court justification for 
invalidation on public policy grounds.154 In Lucky Jack’s Entertain-
ment Center v. Jopat Building Corp.,155 an Alabama Supreme Court 
opinion, the contract involved a shopping center store lease. Lucky 
Jack’s Entertainment Center agreed in the lease that “[t]he Premises 
shall be used and occupied for the purpose of operating a video 
sweepstakes center and for no other purpose without the prior writ-
ten consent of Lessor.”156 While the lease agreement was negotiated, 
the parties were aware that in other pending litigation in Alabama, 
the legality of video-sweepstakes enterprises was being challenged. 
The parties proceeded to execute the lease anyway, with the “hope” 
that the operation of video sweepstakes centers would be found law-
ful.157 Several months into the lease, the Alabama Supreme Court 
ruled that these operations were indeed unlawful, pursuant to a 
statute already on the books.158 Almost immediately after this ruling, 
Lucky Jack’s vacated the premises. At issue between the parties was 
the enforceability of the early termination provision of the lease, 
which, if enforceable, would have been extremely expensive for  
Lucky Jack’s.159
 The Lucky Jack’s court ultimately approached the problem in a 
similar manner to that of the Kardoh court, applying in pari delicto
principles, though not expressly. Citing a similar case160 where opera-
tion of a lease would have “furthered an unlawful restraint of 
trade,”161 the court emphasized that “it is a sound principle that when 
premises are leased for the express purpose of enabling the lessee to 
accomplish an unlawful purpose, the agreement is void and there can 
be no recovery at the suit of either party against the other.”162
The lessee was not compelled to adhere to the termination clause  
 154.  Under the law-and-economics taxonomy, this case might fit well into the bucket of 
contracts to “commit legal acts that themselves facilitate acts against public policy.” Id. at 
1449. 
 155.  Lucky Jack’s Entm’t. Ctr. v. Jopat Bldg. Corp., 32 So. 3d 565 (Ala. 2009). 
 156.  Id. at 566 (emphasis omitted). 
 157.  Id. at 566-67. 
 158.  Id. at 567. See ALA. CODE § 13A-12-27 (1975); Barber v. Jefferson Cnty. Racing 
Ass’n, 960 So.2d 599 (Ala. 2006).  
 159.  Lucky Jack’s Entm’t Ctr., 32 So. 3d at 567. Lucky Jack’s had only been operating 
the business since September 2006 and the Alabama Supreme Court delivered its ruling on 
December 1, 2006. The termination provision provided “ ‘Lessee may terminate the Lease 
at any time after twelve (12) full months of paying rent, provided Lessee gives Lessor nine-
ty (90) days advance written notice and paid a sum equal to four (4) months of the then 
monthly rent with the termination notice.’ ” Id.
160. Id. at 569 (citing Ex parte Rice, 61 So.2d 7 (Ala. 1952)). 
 161.  Id.
 162.  Id. (citing Rice, 61 So. 2d at 9). 
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despite the fact that the purpose of the lease was legal at the time of  
its formation.163
 (c)   Neve v. Davis 
 The South Dakota Supreme Court permitted a substantial forfei-
ture in Neve v. Davis.164 “Neve and Davis frequently gambled with 
each other” at the Elks Club in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. From 
Neve’s account, on one night in December 1992, Neve lost $1500 to 
Davis and was unable to pay him.165 Neve had a litany of other financial 
problems, including taxes overdue to the Internal Revenue Service.166
 To help Neve meet all of his debts, Davis loaned him $2500 in 
short order and the parties executed a promissory note for that 
amount. Neve’s continued financial distress led Davis to refer Neve 
to a bankruptcy attorney.167 After the attorney had reviewed Neve’s 
finances, Davis loaned Neve an additional $30,000.168 Neve main-
tained that this $30,000 amount “included repayment of the $1,500 
gambling debt.”169 Davis put the $30,000 in a trust account at the 
bankruptcy attorney’s law firm and made arrangements for a 
$33,000 promissory note to be executed.170 The amount reflected the 
$30,000, “plus $3,000 representing a renewal of the $2,500 note from 
December, 1992 and $500 in interest.”171 Neve later maintained at 
trial that Davis cautioned him not to tell the attorney “that the pro-
ceeds of the note ‘were going to be used to pay off’ the gambling 
debt.”172 The lawyer managed the disbursements of the proceeds of 
the $30,000 in the trust account.173 Neve testified that $1500 from a 
$4000 check from the account was applied to pay down “his gambling 
debt to Davis.”174
 Well over a decade later, Neve sought to have the promissory note 
declared void, citing section 53-9-2 of South Dakota Codified Laws, 
which provides that promissory notes given in consideration of gam-
bling debts are void.175 The balance due on the note was significant. 
 163.  Id. at 569-70; see Rice, 61 So. 2d at 8-9.  
 164.  775 N.W.2d 80 (S.D. 2009). 
 165.  Id. at 81. 
 166.  Id.
 167.  Id.
 168.  Id.
 169.  Id. at 81-82. 
 170.  Id. at 82. 
 171.  Id.
 172.  Id.
 173.  Id.
 174.  Id.
 175.  Id. Though a criminal statute is not being cited here, I note that this statute is 
proximate to criminal statutes about illegal gambling. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-25-1 
(1998) (“Any person who engages in gambling in any form with cards, dice, or other imple-
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Netting out payments made and including interest accrued, Davis 
counterclaimed against Neve for over $80,000.176
 The Court noted that for over a century, “the [South Dakota] 
[l]egislature has provided that if any part of the consideration for a 
note is for the repayment of money lost in gambling, the entire note 
is absolutely void,”177 and proceeded to declare the entirety of the 
$80,000 note void. As the statute dictates: 
Any note, bond, or other contract made and entered into, where the 
whole or any part of the consideration thereof shall be for money or 
other valuable thing, won or lost, laid, staked, or betted at or upon 
any game of any kind, under any name or by any means; or for the 
repayment of money or other thing of value, lent or advanced, at 
the time and for the purpose of any game, play, bet, or wager, or being 
laid, staked, betted, or wagered thereon shall be absolutely void.178
 Relying upon this statute, South Dakota courts have “consistently 
voided such promissory notes.”179 The dissent maintained that the 
connection between the gambling debt and the promissory note was 
too “attenuated” and that “[i]t would be unfair and contrary to the 
law to allow Neve to void his debt.”180 The majority, however, found 
the statute to be on point and viewed the facts to support the  
connection between the gambling debt and the note. The Court  
recognized that this statute would yield “harsh results in cases where 
only part of the consideration was for gambling, [and that] well  
established law [did] not support the circuit court’s semantical dis-
tinction permitting parties to do indirectly what the Legislature has  
expressly prohibited.”181
 This language should ring familiar. Just as in the licensure cases, 
where courts would tend not to permit unlicensed contractors to col-
lect in quasi-contract when a contract was voided, in these criminal-
flavored cases, courts seek to avoid frustration of the purposes of the 
underlying public policy. In Neve, as elsewhere, the court, upon find-
ing that the contract (promissory note) ran afoul of statute and public 
policy, refrained from enforcing the tainted agreement. The court will 
not compel the debtor to honor the debt. Here, the lender lost recov-
ery on a large promissory note because it was partially tainted with 
an unlawful activity. The windfall accrues to the debtor, perhaps un-
justly on an instant basis, but the ruling preserves the interests of 
                                                                                                                  
ments or devices of any kind wherein anything valuable is wagered upon the outcome . . . is 
guilty of a . . . misdemeanor.”). 
 176.  Neve, 775 N.W.2d at 82.  
 177.  Id. at 83. 
 178.  Id. at 83-84 (underlined emphasis added) (citing S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 53-9-2 
(1990) (emphasis added)). 
 179.  Id. at 84. 
 180.  Id. at 89 (Meierhenry, J., dissenting). 
 181.  Id. at 86 (majority opinion). 
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the public, through deterrence of entry into unlawful bargains,182 for 
example. One is again reminded that the courts’ rulings in these cas-
es are not meant to reward parties like Neve. In the spirit of section 
598 of the Restatement (First) of Contracts, comment a, these cases 
are not about rewarding a given party—they are about declining to aid 
any party through enforcement of an illegal bargain. 
 The common result running through these cases is that the courts 
seem to leave the parties where they stood prior to the litigation. 
 3.   Agreements That Limit or Shift Liability 
 The remaining largest segments of cases in the contravention of 
statutes or regulations involve indemnification, exculpatory clauses, 
and general agreements to shift or limit liability. The number of cas-
es—they constitute about twenty-nine percent of all of the public pol-
icy cases in my sample—justifies a separate exploration of the con-
tent of the category. Though statistically the sample size is small, it 
appears that the defense is twice as successful within the “direct con-
travention” category than it is in the “general public policy” category, 
mirroring the larger sample. This category of cases has proven trou-
blesome for some to analyze, but I offer a few illustrations here of 
where the defense presents a statutory conflict. Where a statute 
speaks, as demonstrated in the other cases, a court’s analytical task 
becomes much less burdensome. Again, I describe the successful  
instances of public policy defense because the judicial process is  
more explicit. 
 (a)   Dubey v. Public Storage, Inc.
 In the Illinois appellate case, Dubey v. Public Storage, Inc.,183 the 
public policy defense issue involved an exculpatory clause.184 The 
plaintiff sought damages from a storage-unit rental company for loss 
of her property.185 Dubey entered into a rental agreement with 
Metropublic for a storage unit.186 The rental agreement contained 
clauses187 that stated that Metropublic’s total liability for any loss of 
Dubey’s property would be limited to $5000.188
 182.  See generally Kostritsky, supra note 17. 
 183.  Dubey v. Public Storage, Inc., 918 N.E.2d 265 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009). 
 184.  Id. at 274. 
 185.  Id. at 271. 
 186.  Id.
 187.  The clauses at issue stated:  
  3. USE OF PREMISES AND PROPERTY AND COMPLIANCE WITH LAW. 
Occupant shall store only personal property that belongs to Occupant. Because 
the value of the personal property may be difficult or impossible to ascertain, 
Occupant agrees that under no circumstances will the aggregate value of all 
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 After a series of misunderstandings and blunders, the defendant 
ultimately auctioned off Dubey’s property for $99,145 pursuant to  
the defendant’s interpretation of other clauses in the lease and the  
Illinois statutes.189
 At trial, the jury found the defendant liable on a number of 
counts, returning $5000 verdicts for both breach of contract and con-
version, plus $745,000 in punitive damages for the conversion 
count.190 From the bench, the trial court tried the count that alleged a 
violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, awarding $69,145 in 
compensatory damages and $207,435 in punitive damages, in addi-
tion to $185,849 in costs and attorney fees.191
 On appeal, Metropublic argued that in awarding damages in ex-
cess of $5000, the court improperly ignored the contract’s limitation 
of liability clause. At trial, Dubey successfully contended that despite 
the fact that the rental agreement was for a storage unit and not a 
residential lease, the contract constituted a lease that was covered 
under the Illinois Landlord and Tenant Act.192 This distinction mat-
tered because the Landlord and Tenant Act looked disfavorably upon 
liability-limitation clauses. The appellate court upheld the trial 
court’s finding that the Landlord and Tenant Act invalidated the 
$5000 damages limitation provision. When the parties entered into 
a rental agreement, the Landlord and Tenant Act stated: 
[E]very covenant, agreement or understanding in or in connection 
with . . . any lease of real property, exempting the lessor from lia-
bility for damages for injuries to person or property caused by or 
resulting from the negligence of the lessor, . . . in the operation or 
maintenance of the demised premises or the real property contain-
ing the demised premises shall be deemed to be void as against 
public policy and wholly unenforceable.193
                                                                                                                  
personal property stored in the Premises exceed, or be deemed to exceed, 
$5,000 and may be worth substantially less than $5,000. 
. . . . 
  5. LIMITATION OF OWNER’S LIABILITY; INDEMNITY. Occupant shall 
indemnify, defendant, and hold Owner and Owner’s Agents harmless from and 
Loss incurred by Owner or Owner’s Agents in any way arising out of Occu-
pant’s use of the Premises or the Property. Occupant agrees that Owner’s and 
Owner’s Agents’ total responsibility for any Loss from any cause will not exceed 
a total of $5,000.  
Id.
 188.  Id.
 189.  Id. at 273. For an illustration of what this process probably looked like, see the 
television series Storage Wars (A&E Television). 
 190.  See Dubey, 918 N.E.2d at 273.
 191.  Id.
 192.  765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 705/0.01 (West 1998); see Dubey, N.E.2d at 275. 
 193.  765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 705/0.01 (West 1998); see Dubey, N.E.2d at 275. 
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 The statute proved dispositive in determining that the exculpatory 
clause would not be enforced on public policy grounds, because the 
“legislative directive [was] to the contrary.”194 The statute helped the 
plaintiff immensely because “[c]ontractual limitations are generally 
held valid in Illinois, unless it would be against the settled public pol-
icy of the state to do so,”195 as it was there.  
 Interestingly, the case law did leave the door open for other public 
policy challenges to the contractual limitations outside of settled poli-
cy, noting that such a clause could be voided if “there is something in 
the social relationship between the parties militating against uphold-
ing the agreement.”196 In Part IV.B., I return to the damage-
limitation cases to describe a few of the successful “broad appeals to  
public policy.” 
 (b)   Hubner v. Spring Valley Equestrian Center.
 The next damage-limitation case involved an actual “unruly” 
horse, one that injured the plaintiff. Hubner v. Spring Valley Eques-
trian Center197 addressed a familiar type of exculpatory clause, a 
clause that shifts liability for personal injury related to use of a 
product, service, or property onto a consumer. Hubner entered into 
an agreement with Spring Valley Equestrian Center where the Cen-
ter would provide horses for her to ride on Equestrian Center proper-
ty under the guidance of an employee.198 Before she mounted a horse, 
Hubner “signed a rental agreement and a release discharging Spring 
Valley of its liability for any injury she might sustain due to the ordi-
nary negligence of Spring Valley or its agents in relation to its ‘prem-
ises and operations.’ ”199
 Through a grimly described series of events that may have been 
the result of “Spring Valley’s negligence in equipping and using its 
 194.  Dubey, 918 N.E.2d at 276.  
 195.  Id.
 196.  Id. (citing First Fin. Ins. Co. v. Purolator Sec., Inc., 388 N.E.2d. 17, 20 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1979)). 
 197.  Hubner v. Spring Valley Equestrian Ctr., 975 A.2d 992 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2009), rev’d, 203 N.J. 184 (2010). As established supra Part III, the analysis in this Article 
has no stake in subsequent results, such as reversal. This analysis consistently focuses on 
the run of decisions during this period in 2009. Therefore, the intermediate appellate 
court’s reasoning remains relevant for my purposes. 
 198.  Id. at 994. 
 199.  Id. “The release agreement provided: ‘In consideration of THIS STABLE allowing 
my participation in this activity, . . . I, the rider . . . do agree to hold harmless, release, and 
discharge THIS STABLE, its owners, agents, employees . . . and others acting on its be-
half . . . of and from all claims, demands, causes of action and legal liability . . . due to 
THIS STABLE’S . . . ordinary negligence; and I do further agree that except in the event of 
THIS STABLE’S gross negligence and willful and wanton misconduct, I shall not bring any 
claims, demands, legal actions and causes of action, against THIS STABLE . . . for any 
economic and non-economic losses due to bodily injury, death, property damage, sustained 
by me . . . in relation to the premises and operations of THIS STABLE...’ ” Id. at 997-98. 
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barn,”200 Hubner was thrown from her horse before even leaving the 
stable. The horse fell on top of the plaintiff, rolling over her. Hubner 
suffered fractures and other injuries.201
 Spring Valley maintained that the exculpatory clause shielded it 
from liability. Hubner argued that the clause was unenforceable on 
public policy grounds. Just as in Dubey, the state legislature had 
spoken to this specific problem directly, though not through a tradi-
tional statute per se. In New Jersey, the legislature had passed a 
finding and declaration of the public policy of the state regarding 
“equine animal activities” and risk allocation between operators like 
Spring Valley and consumers like Hubner.202 The legislature also de-
tailed some exceptions from this general declaration of public policy, 
including exceptions to the “limitations on liability for operators.”203
 The court, in considering the legislative stance, noted that the 
“inherent risks” assumed by a participant “[did] not include every 
danger on a training track or in a riding ring.”204 The court ultimately 
focused on whether the exculpatory provision was unenforceable be-
cause the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by “Spring Valley’s use of 
faulty equipment or its acts or omissions ‘constitut[ing] negligent dis-
regard for [her] safety.’ ”205 The court viewed that the facts were suffi-
ciently alleged to support a claim that Spring Valley knew that the 
 200.  Id. at 995. 
 201.  Id. at 994-95. 
 202.  Id. at 994. This specific proclamation of public policy is worth examina-
tion: 
  The Legislature finds and declares that equine animal activities are prac-
ticed by a large number of citizens of this State; that equine animal activities 
attract large numbers of nonresidents to the State; that those activities signifi-
cantly contribute to the economy of this State; and that horse farms are a major 
land use which preserves open space. 
  The Legislature further finds and declares that equine animal activities in-
volve risks that are essentially impractical or impossible for the operator to 
eliminate; and that those risks must be borne by those who engage in those ac-
tivities. 
  The Legislature therefore determines that the allocation of the risks and 
costs of equine animal activities is an important matter of public policy and it is 
appropriate to state in law those risks that the participant voluntarily assumes 
for which there can be no recovery. (emphasis added).  
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:15-1 (West 1998). 
 203.  See Hubner, 975 A.2d at 995 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:15-9 (West 
1998)). Among them: 
(a) Knowingly providing equipment or tack that is faulty to the extent that it 
causes or contributes to injury . . . . (d) An act or omission on the part of the op-
erator that constitutes negligent disregard for the participant’s safety, which act 
or omission causes the injury . . . . (emphasis added). 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:15-9 (West 1998). 
 204.  See Hubner, 975 A.2d at 996 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:15-3 (West 1998)). 
 205.  Id. at 998 (first alteration in original). 
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equipment it provided to Hubner was faulty and negligently placed in 
an improper position.206 These factors, taken together, satisfied the leg-
islature’s explicit exceptions to exculpatory clause enforceability.207
 For these reasons and others, the court refused to affirm the trial 
court’s summary judgment ruling in favor of Spring Valley.208 The 
general policy approach in New Jersey toward exculpatory agree-
ments stands in contrast to that of Illinois’, as described in Dubey,
where “contractual limitations are generally held valid.”209 In New 
Jersey, “[e]xculpatory agreements have long been disfavored in the 
law because they encourage a lack of care. For that reason, courts 
closely scrutinize liability releases and invalidate them if they vio-
late public policy . . . .”210 In this instance, New Jersey went to some 
pains to describe the exception to this rule (and the exceptions to 
the exceptions) with respect to recreational activities. 
 These damage limitation cases strongly reflect the common law 
approaches followed by the individual jurisdictions—and at the risk 
of making an observation that may seem redundant, rely heavily on 
the jurisdiction’s statutory regime. Though the presumptions about 
exculpatory provisions can lean one way or the other, the justification 
for escaping from the liability-shifting or limiting provision reflects 
how the legislature addressed the specific subject matter relating to 
the underlying activity. 
 4.   Other Cases and Summary 
 The subject matter of the other public policy defense cases involv-
ing contravention of a statute and regulation span the gamut of 
commercial and human relations. The eighteen cases excluded from 
the categories of licensure, criminality, and limitation or shifting of 
liability constitute thirty-seven percent of the remainder. The subject 
matter of these cases broadly ranges from attorney ethics codes and 
attorney fee agreements,211 to securities,212 family law,213 and assorted 
insurance matters,214 among others.   
 206.  Id. at 997. 
 207.  Id. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:15-9(a) & (d) (West 1998).  
 208.  See Hubner, 975 A.2d at 999. 
 209.  Dubey v. Public Storage, 918 N.E.2d 265, 276 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009). 
 210.  See Hubner, 975 A.2d at 998 (quoting Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park, 901 A.2d 
381, 386 (N.J. 2006)). 
 211.  See, e.g., Shafron & Kammer, LLP v. Krane & Smith, No. B200392, 2009 WL 
2152902 (Cal. Ct. App. July 21, 2009); Sunglass Designs, Inc. v. Wild Style Sunglasses, No. 
CV-08-1984-PHX-DGC, 2009 WL 2827953 (D. Ariz. Sept. 1, 2009). 
 212.  See, e.g., Frishman v. Maginn, 912 N.E.2d 468 (Mass. App. Ct. 2009); see also
More Light Invs. v. Morgan Stanley DW Inc., No. CV 08-0580-PHX-MHM, 2009 WL 
2382997 (D. Ariz. Aug. 4, 2009). 
 213.  See, e.g., Chenault v. Banks, 296 S.W.3d 186 (Tex. App. 2009). 
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 The public policy defense in these miscellaneous cases is success-
ful fifty percent of the time, below that of the other categories within 
the direct-contravention cases when combined (sixty-five percent), 
but still substantially above that of the success rate of the defense in 
general public policy cases (thirty-one percent). 
 Put in the broadest terms, the public policy defense is more often 
successfully invoked and resolved in the most “ruly” manner when it 
is closely linked to a statute or promulgated regulation than when it 
is not. Occasionally, the public policy emerges directly from a statute, 
as in many of the licensing cases—and sometimes state legislatures 
expressly spell out public policy, as they did with respect to enforce-
ability of exculpatory clauses.  
 As I move to explore the comparatively less successful public poli-
cy defense efforts that do not cite to a statute or regulation, but ra-
ther appeal more broadly, I do so with the hypothesis that this is 
where the descendents of the “unruly horse” that Judge Burrough 
described in 1821 now run wild.215
B.   Content of General Public Policy Cases 
 The public policy defense “horse” starts to buck a bit more in the 
set of cases that appeal more broadly toward a general violation of 
public policy rather than a statutory one. As noted, the success rate 
of the defense in this category appears to be half that experienced in 
the statutory/regulatory category of cases. Fewer bright patterns 
emerge in this category, as the cases tend not to cluster as tightly 
around subject matter or other dimensions, with the exception of 
agreements that limit or shift liability. No particular subsets of broad-
er, nonstatutory public policy defense cases or subject matter seem to 
reflect differing levels of success. 
 This makes description of these cases somewhat more challenging, 
especially in light of the fact that sixty-nine percent of defenses 
brought in this category fail. It is much easier to describe the reasons 
and conditions for the defenses that succeed (the logic tends to be 
more explicit) than it is for defenses that fail. Nonetheless, I attempt 
to describe some distinct phenomena exhibited in both scenarios. 
 In examining the content of the broader public policy cases, I first 
look at the cluster of cases that fall under agreements that limit or 
shift liability, focusing on a few of the successful claims so that the 
reasoning can be examined more closely. Then, I examine a few other 
                                                                                                                  
 214.  See, e.g., Abay v. DaimlerChrysler Ins. Co., No. 283624, 2009 WL 2477623 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 2009); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garzone, Nos. 07-4767, 08-3895, 2009 WL 
2996468 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 2009). 
 215.  Richardson v. Mellish, (1824) 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303; 2 Bing 229, 252 (Burrough 
J.). 
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successful claims in this “general public policy” category to see if a 
pattern can be discerned. Finally, I select a handful of cases that are 
difficult to aggregate within the “general public policy” defense cate-
gory—the cases where the defense fails. A closer examination of the 
failed defenses in the “other” category is required,216 even if firm con-
clusions cannot be drawn outside of the fact that the “other category” 
might contain the parties who are pursuing defenses that would 
prove highly unruly if accepted by courts. 
 In this category, one can hypothesize that if case law exists to 
support the public policy claim, the defense is more likely to be suc-
cessful. This is why I have labeled those types of cases “somewhat 
ruly” and the remaining unsuccessful cases “unruly. 
Table 4 
 Broad Defenses that Contravene Limit/Shift Liability              
Versus Other  
Contravention of 
Broader Public 
Policy 
Total Cases “Successful” Cases Success Rate 
Agreements That 
Limit or Shift 
Liability
17 4 24% 
Other 32 11 34% 
Total 49 15 31% 
 1.   Agreements that Limit or Shift Liability 
 As discussed in Part IV.A, exculpatory and indemnity clauses and 
other contractual limitations of liability comprise a significant num-
ber of cases where the public policy defense is invoked. In the limita-
tion/shifting of liability cases, the defense succeeds roughly half as 
often in the “general category” as it does in the “contra stat-
ute/regulation” category. (This finding mirrors the overall set of cas-
es.) Visiting the opinions that illustrate a successful public policy de-
fense in the “general” category can inform an understanding of how 
these courts make decisions in the absence of a statute—and can in-
form the question of how “unruly” they are. 
 216.  Within the general public policy category, twenty-three cases where the public 
policy defense failed fell into the “other” classification. This subset of cases constitutes just 
over twenty percent of the entire sample. 
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 (a)   Tatman v. Space Coast Kennel Club, Inc.
Tatman v. Space Coast Kennel Club, Inc., a Florida appellate case, 
presents a classic example of a successful general public policy chal-
lenge to an exculpatory clause.217 The plaintiff, Tatman, entered her 
dog into a dog show operated by the Kennel Cub and signed an entry 
form that contained the following language: 
I certify that I am the owner of this dog and furthermore, I(we) 
certify and represent that the dog entered is not a hazard to  
persons or other dogs. I agree to not hold [Space Coast Kennel 
Club] or Brevard County Parks & Rec Dept. liable for any accident  
or injury.218
 On the day of the dog show, Tatman suffered injury when she was 
bitten in the ankle by a “100-pound, non-neutered male Akita.”219
Though she had signed a form where she agreed to assume the risk 
for accident and injury, the court refused to enforce the exculpatory 
clause in favor of the Space Coast Kennel Club. Drawing upon Flori-
da precedent, the court noted that “[t]hese clauses are by public poli-
cy disfavored in the law because they relieve one party of the obliga-
tion to use due care, [shifting] the risk of injury to the party who is 
probably least equipped to take the necessary precautions to avoid 
injury and bear the risk of loss.”220 Tatman marshaled the facts to 
meet this judicially created standard, and she prevailed.221
 Importantly, the court sourced public policy in this case from other 
courts—essentially using previous opinions about public policy as le-
gal precedent. No legislation or regulation was situated proximate to 
the reasoning. In the next case, Vistein v. American Registry of Radi-
ologic Technologists, this method of using precedent also appears. 
After laying out the facts of Vistein, I highlight the problem that un-
derlies this subcategory of “general” public policy cases.  
(b) Vistein v. American Registry of Radiologic Technologists
 In Vistein,222 a radiologic technologist challenged the validity of a 
clause in a form contract indemnifying her profession’s private ac-
crediting agency for any legal fees relating to her application or re-
newal of registration.223 After a dispute involving some alleged mis-
 217.  Tatman v. Space Coast Kennel Club, Inc., 27 So.3d 108 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009). 
 218.  Id. at 109. 
 219.  Id. at 110. 
 220.  Id. (citing Loewe v. Seagate Homes, Inc., 987 So.2d 758, 760 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) 
and Cain v. Banka, 932 So.2d 575, 578 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)). 
 221.  Id. at 111. 
 222.  Vistein v. Am. Registry of Radiologic Technologists. 342 F. App’x 113 (6th Cir. 
2009). 
 223. The clause in question: 
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deeds on the part of Vistein with respect to her registration, the 
accrediting agency attempted to collect $150,000 in costs and at-
torney fees pursuant to the clause.224
 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit considered Vistein’s claims that the 
indemnity clause (which, in effect, is a clause intended by the accred-
iting agency to shift risk and liability related to litigation costs) was 
unenforceable.225 Vistein also argued that the clause should be inval-
idated on grounds of unconscionability.226 She separately contended 
that enforcement of such a clause would violate the public policy of the 
state of Ohio.227
 In this case, the court looked to Ohio case law precedents and 
found that the clause, as applied to attorney fees, was enforceable. 
According to the court:  
In Scotts [], we . . . recognized the long-standing rule in Ohio that 
“a stipulation by parties to a contract which permits attorney fees 
to be awarded as costs of collection upon default is void and 
against public policy,” while acknowledging that several Ohio 
courts have carved out an exception where the parties have specifi-
cally negotiated the provision.228
In this instance, the attorney-fee component of the clause was not 
specifically negotiated—it was part of a boilerplate adhesion con-
tract.229 The Sixth Circuit barred the accrediting agency from enforc-
ing that portion of the clause and receiving indemnity for the fees 
because it would violate public policy to do so.230
                                                                                                                  
I hereby waive and release, and shall indemnify and hold harmless, the [Amer-
ican Registry of Radiologic Technologists “ARRT”] . . . from, against, and with 
respect to any and all claims, losses, costs, expenses, damages, and judgments 
(including reasonable attorney’s fees) that arise or are alleged to have arisen, 
from, out of, with respect to, or in connection with this application, . . . the fail-
ure of the ARRT to renew the registration of a certificate previously issued to 
me, or the ARRT’s notification of legitimately interested persons of such actions 
taken by the ARRT.  
Id. at 119. 
 224.  Id. at 118. 
 225.  Id. at 118-28. 
 226.  The court rejected the argument that the clause met the criteria for procedural or 
substantive unconscionability and moved on to address the public policy question. Id. at
119-24. Unconscionability is a defense rooted in the transactional relationship and process 
between the two parties, as opposed to any public interest. The public policy defense—in 
contrast—seems to be more explicitly focused on the appropriateness of the use of a public 
court as a mechanism for enforcing a private contract, as the criminal agreement cases
indicate, and on the impact on the public.  
 227.  Id.
 228.  Id. at 124 (emphasis added) (citing Scotts Co. v. Cent. Garden & Pet Co., 403 F.3d 
781, 791 (6th Cir. 2005)). 
 229.  Id.
 230.  Id. at 124-25. 
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 Here, this general appeal to a public policy defense was presented 
much like any garden-variety, common law decision. Because Ohio 
law was developed in this area, the radiologic technologist had solid 
ground to plead on. The appeal may have been broad, but it was an  
appeal to established case law. Nonetheless, at its very root, the public  
policy declared in this instance was developed by the courts—not by  
the legislature.231
 When the public policy defense is raised, if a statute or regulation 
is not expressly involved, the source of the public policy could be any-
thing. The approach to discerning public policy by a court could re-
semble a common law adjudicative approach, similar to the Vistein
opinion, but it can be broader. A comprehensive census of the sources 
drawn upon for public policy could provide material for separate 
study. But an open invitation for a court to discern public policy could 
indeed become somewhat “unruly” if the sources are unconstrained.232
In this case, the public policy was manufactured in previous opinions 
and then strengthened through further citation until the Vistein
court applied it.  
 In the context of tort law, noted scholar and judge, Hans Linde, 
identified the trouble inherent in having judges apply public policy 
without a legislative source: 
The decisive difference . . . is that legislation is legitimately politi-
cal and judging is not. Unless a court can attribute public policy to 
a politically accountable source, it must resolve novel issues of lia-
bility within a matrix of statutes and tort principles without claim-
ing public policy for its own decision. Only this preserves the dis-
tinction between the adjudicative and the legislative function.233
 Linde’s legitimacy problem emerges within this subset of “general” 
cases. The structural problem he identified almost certainly contrib-
utes to the “unruly horse” perception. Should the Ohio courts have 
spoken on this attorney fees indemnity question in Vistein, or should 
they have deferred to the legislature—or perhaps other rules regulat-
ing attorney fees? Similarly, should the Florida courts have spoken 
about public policy at all in evaluating this tort exculpatory clause in 
Tatman? A fundamental structural tension emerges between the  
legislative role in creating public policy and its political nature  
and the adjudicative role. In this context, I can only attempt briefly 
 231.  Beginning, apparently, in this instance, with Colonel’s Inc. v. Cincinnati Milacron 
Mktg., Nos. 96-1243, 96-1244, 1998 WL 321061 (6th Cir. June 1, 1998).  
 232.  See McNeal, supra note 24, at 157-74 for a further complicating discussion of the 
different areas in private law where public policy questions are injected into judicial deci-
sionmaking. 
 233.  Hans A. Linde, Courts and Torts: “Public Policy” Without Public Politics? 28 VAL.
U. L. REV. 821, 855 (1994). For a slightly more expansive view of the judicial role, see
Gellhorn, supra note 21, at 695. 
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to describe this phenomenon, as it raises extremely complex  
jurisprudential issues. 
 On closer inspection, these “successful cases” appear to be at an 
intermediate level of ruliness (I call them “somewhat ruly”). The 
judges in the cases use the term “public policy” when perhaps they 
should be using the language of the common law. The words “public 
policy” take on a different meaning than the common law—a politi-
cally-charged meaning, as Linde observed. Though the results in the-
se two cases from the sample (and the next two successful cases I dis-
cuss in Subsection 2 of this Part) rely on a series of precedents—the 
“public policy” language gives a misimpression that the courts  
are making a political call, rather than discerning common law in a  
traditional manner.  
 2.   General/Broad Appeal Cases Where the Defense  
was Successful 
 Outside of the exculpatory cases, nine other cases in the broader 
sample of “general cases” exhibited a successful deployment of the 
public policy defense. Below, I provide two examples. 
 (a)   Chappell v. Butterfield-Odin School District No. 836
 Chappell v. Butterfield-Odin School District No. 836 involved a 
federal disability discrimination complaint brought by a school 
teacher against a school district.234 The contract at issue was the re-
lease signed by the teacher upon her resignation.235 In exchange for a 
brief extension of salary and benefits, the teacher agreed to end her 
employment and release all claims against the district.236 In addition 
to the salary and benefits, the district agreed to an additional com-
mitment: “In return the district will not report you to the Board of 
Teaching in the state of Minnesota regarding the revocation of your 
teaching license.”237
 Though the public policy defense was not dispositive in Chap-
pell,238 the court rendered the release clause binding the school dis-
trict from reporting a teacher to the Board of Teaching for miscon-
duct unenforceable on public policy grounds.239 This finding—which 
could almost be classified as dicta, given the severability of the 
 234.  Chappell v. Butterfield-Oden Sch. Dist. No. 836, 673 F. Supp. 2d 818, 819 (D. 
Minn. 2009). 
 235.  Id. at 827. 
 236.  Id. at 827-28. 
 237.  Id.
 238.  In part, because even though the clause was unenforceable, the release contained 
a severability clause. Id. at 831-32. 
 239.  Id.
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clause—was made almost summarily.240 The court cited to a case for 
the broad proposition that “[a] contract violating law or public policy 
is void.”241 The Chappell court noted that even the school district did 
not “seriously dispute” the public policy issue—that the school district 
could not agree to surrender its duty to report information to the Board 
of Teaching for the public good.242
 Here, the analysis did not rely on a statute or a code. The logic of 
Chappell seemed to be that it was just entirely obvious that enforce-
ment of such an agreement would violate public policy and injure the 
public good.243 Though this rationale may indeed appeal directly to 
common sense, this declaration of public policy was accompanied by 
little explanation.244 The Minnesota legislature or educational regula-
tory authorities could have fashioned an explicit and clear rule about 
misconduct reporting, but they never did.  
 The question remains: Would it have been more appropriate and 
orderly for a court facing this problem simply to point out that the 
legislature and regulators had not spoken to this question, inviting 
interested parties to change or create the law through the political 
process? Would such an approach bring more order and certainty 
and, if so, would it be worth sacrificing the judicial flexibility? Again, 
these questions are easier to raise than answer. Nonetheless, though 
this approach is not as ordered as one that relies on established polit-
ically created law, the use of precedent, even as attenuated as it was 
in Chappell, lends some small degree of order and legitimacy. 
 (b)   Cope v. Cope
 The public policy defense surfaces frequently in family law,245 as 
parties contract to rearrange financial commitments after a separa-
tion or divorce. Cope v. Cope,246 an Oklahoma appellate case, consid-
ered whether a parent’s agreement to waive child support is unen-
forceable on public policy grounds. In Cope, Mother had agreed to 
waive child support in exchange for Father’s surrender of his visita-
 240.  Id.
 241.  Id. (citing Barna, Guzy & Steffen, Ltd. v. Beens, 541 N.W.2d 354, 356 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1995)). Ironically, the case the court cited to support this proposition would fall into 
the category of a public policy defense involving violation of a code—not a general appeal to 
public policy. See Barna, 541 N.W.2d at 356. The code at issue was Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 
1.5.  
 242.  Chappell, 673 F. Supp. 2d at 831. 
 243.  The plaintiff, who would have benefited from the protection of the clause, chal-
lenged it on its face to attempt to invalidate the entire release. This proved unsuccessful. 
Id. at 831-33. 
 244.  One also wonders why this court felt the need to make this declaration of public 
policy when it was not required to do so to bring about a resolution of the broader issues.  
 245.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 189-191 (1981). 
 246.  231 P.3d 737 (Okla. Civ. App. 2009). 
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tion and contact rights.247  Several years passed, and Mother sought to 
invalidate that bargain as unlawful and receive back child support.248
 In this instance, once again, no formal legislation or rule was di-
rectly invoked in conjunction with the public policy defense.249 Noting 
that “[t]he validity and legal effect of mutual agreements to waive 
child support have been litigated for a substantial number of 
years,”250 the court’s analysis focused on interpreting prior case law 
as if it were common law, comparing and contrasting the facts of the 
instant case to determine whether the agreement was enforceable.251
 Having determined rather summarily that the agreement was un-
enforceable on public policy grounds, the court ruled that Father, in 
theory, would be held responsible to pay child support in spite of his 
agreement with Mother.252 In other words, the court discerned public 
policy. In the end, however, the court did not need to do so since it 
refused to find for Mother on grounds of equitable estoppel.253 Again, 
as appears typical in cases where statutes or regulations fail to speak 
directly to the public policy question in controversy, the court relied 
on other judicial constructions to discern the policy itself.  
 Of note in Cope, one judge waxed about why the agreement be-
tween Mother and Father should have been enforceable in a special 
concurrence. The concurrence is worth examining in more detail be-
cause the judge engages in policy advocacy, noting that nonenforce-
ment would have the court actively promoting undesirable ends: 
I . . . assert that the contract is enforceable. . . . Father did not pay 
child support, but at a cost of the irrevocable loss of the joy and 
love of his children in the bargain. Father can never recover these 
fleeting childhood moments, nor can they be recreated. Mother re-
ceived the entire benefit of her contract with Father. Now, she 
wants that consideration which she relinquished, that is the un-
paid child support for her children when they were minors, but 
who are now adults . . . . I note that if this Court were to deny en-
forcement of this contract . . . such would be tantamount to con-
doning deceit and fraud . . . . A denial would also ignore the loss 
Father has endured because he honored and performed the oral 
contract to his detriment.254
 247.  Id. at 738. 
 248.  Id. at 739. 
 249.  Brief reference was made to an Oklahoma Supreme Court decision regarding sup-
port modification in the context of a related statute, OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 112(A)(3) (West 
2008). Id. at 740 (citing Hedges v. Hedges, 66 P.3d 364 (Okla. 2002)). 
 250.  Id. at 739.  
 251.  Id. at 739-40. 
 252.  Id. at 740. 
 253.  Id.
 254.  Id. at 741 (Rapp, J., specially concurring) (emphasis added). 
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 Could this concurrence have simply stated that the legislature has 
passed statutes relating to child support—but none prohibiting this 
type of bargain? Should the issues raised by the concurrence (and 
conspicuously ignored in the majority opinion) have been debated in 
a courtroom, or on the floor of a legislature? These questions surface 
when the public policy defense is entertained in a general context, 
outside of a statute or regulation.  
 Having now explored the way courts have addressed the success-
ful broad appeals to public policy, I next explore the larger set of un-
successful broad appeals to public policy as a defense to contract. 
These cases prove much more difficult to characterize. 
 3.   General Cases Where the Defense was Unsuccessful 
 Generalizing about the cases where the public policy defense was 
pled or resolved broadly and unsuccessfully can prove challenging, 
but a noteworthy portion of the opinions falls into this amorphous 
category. These cases reflect situations where a party sought to inval-
idate an agreement and used this defense—potentially as a last re-
sort. As Judge Burrough put it, perhaps with some overstatement, “It 
is never argued at all but when other points fail.”255
 Nonetheless, in each of these cases, the court addressed and re-
solved the defense, upholding the contract. Because these cases do 
not give the defense a foothold, nor do they offer much logic for reject-
ing the defense, I label them “unruly.” Though it could be argued that 
order exists when a court rejects the defense for lack of any support, 
these cases seem to constitute one party pleading in the dark, looking 
for any way out of the contract. Just the fact that the defense invites 
these claims may contribute to the “unruly” reputation. 
 Given the variety in this group of cases, it might prove worthwhile 
to describe several of them summarily. The first opinion, McDermott 
v. Franklin, shows us a court that rejects the public policy defense 
simply because it could not find statutory, case precedent, or any 
hard authority to do so.256
 (a)   McDermott v. Franklin 
 In McDermott, a party wished to void certain obligations on the 
basis that the underlying contract involved ownership of a profes-
sional corporation by nonprofessionals.257 The voiding party argued 
that “the obligations in question were contrary to public policy as ex-
 255.  Richardson v. Mellish, (1824) 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303; 2 Bing 229, 252 (Burrough 
J.). 
 256.  McDermott v. Franklin, No. 2009-G-2903, 2009 WL 4894599 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 
18, 2009). 
 257.  Id. at *2. 
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pressed by statute and therefore were invalid, unenforceable con-
tracts.”258 The court held that the obligations were enforceable be-
cause there was no authority that indicated otherwise. The appel-
lants cited to some state statutes that covered professional associa-
tions, but they were “inapposite to the instant situation.”259 I assume 
that there must have been a lot of creative, unanchored bluster in the 
lawyering because the court concluded: “While appellants go to great 
lengths to make this [public policy] argument, they have failed to cite 
to any case law to support this proposition.”260 This court seemed un-
willing to buy any policy arguments that were not supported by stat-
ute or case law.261
 (b)   United States v. Korangy Radiology Association,
 Korangy Radiology attempted to challenge the validity of a volun-
tary agreement it had entered with the Food and Drug Administra-
tion to settle a dispute over violation of the Mammography Quality 
Standards Act (MQSA).262 Korangy Radiology had agreed to pay a 
penalty, then defaulted on that payment and challenged the validity 
of the agreement, raising eighteen affirmative defenses.263 Consistent 
with Judge Burrough’s observation that the public policy defense can be 
a last resort,264 the defense was raised here and quickly dispatched.265
 The court did not address the merits of Korangy Radiology’s public 
policy arguments. Instead, the court turned the argument around 
and posited that public policy would support the enforcement of this 
agreement—because the agreement held Korangy Radiology respon-
sible for violating the MQSA, which is established public policy.266
 This case may be another illustration that Judge Burrough’s 
aforementioned “defense of last resort” observation held up well over 
the past 200 years. This defense may indeed be the “Hail Mary pass” 
of contractual defenses. But Korangy Radiology also raises intrigue 
because the court provided an interesting quirk. The defense was de-
void of support, but there was public policy supporting enforcement, 
and it was in the interest of promoting a statute. When invited to go 
 258.  Id.
 259.  Id. at *3. I decided to categorize this case as “general” and not statuto-
ry/regulatory or hybrid because the statutes that were unsuccessfully raised were attenu-
ated from the problem. 
 260.  Id. at *2. 
 261.  Though, again, it might even be troublesome that the court left open the possibil-
ity that judicially-made “case law” could support a public policy finding. 
 262.  United States v. Korangy Radiology Ass’n, No. RDB-09-cv-0623, 2009 WL 
5108833, at *1 (D. Md. Dec. 17, 2009). 
 263.  Id. at *3. 
 264.  See Richardson v. Mellish, (1824) 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303, 2 Bing 229, 252 (Bur-
rough J.). 
 265.  Korangy Radiology Ass’n, 2009 WL 5108833, at *4. 
 266.  Id.
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there, the court did not hesitate to take the opportunity to point out 
that public policy ran the opposite way. 
 (c)   Siuda v. Tobin
 The procedural issue in Siuda v. Tobin focused on whether parties 
could contract around statutes of limitation without violating public 
policy—an issue that surfaced as the crux of other cases within the 
general defense category.267 Siuda substantively dealt with a warran-
ty issue with respect to the retail purchase of a modular home.268 The 
Siudas, the purchasers, made several claims about defects and defi-
ciencies in the construction process, filing a civil complaint several 
years after the purchase. Tobin, the retailer, noted that the original 
agreement stated that “[a]ny action brought by the Purchaser against 
the Retailer of the home and any action brought by the Purchaser . . . 
whether based in tort, [or] in contract . . . must be brought and filed 
no later than one year from the date of the sale of the home.”269
 The Siudas challenged this time-limitation clause, claiming that 
the residual statute of limitations should apply. Among other defens-
es, the court addressed whether the clause was unconscionable. Im-
portantly, however, the court first noted that “[t]he Siudas have not 
shown a public policy clearly rooted in the law that prohibits this 
type of limitation.”270
 The Siuda court put the burden onto the Siudas and set a stand-
ard that required “clear roots” in the law to void this part of the con-
tract. The court did not present any further analysis in the opinion or 
address any specific deficiencies that the plaintiffs may or may not 
have raised, aside from citing a case that supported the court’s opin-
ion.271 Although a statute was at issue here, no general public policy 
argument emerged to support the notion that these parties could not 
be permitted to contract around the statute. This case is thus an ex-
cellent example of a court declining an open invitation to explore and 
discuss public policy. Here, the court deferred heavily to whether the 
law had spoken—and did not try to fill in the gaps.  
 267.  Siuda v. Tobin, No. 285618, 2009 WL 3110817 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2009); see, 
e.g., In re Dreier LLP, 421 B.R. 60 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); Ray v. FedEx Corp. Servs., 668 
F. Supp. 2d 1063 (W.D. Tenn. 2009); Stecz v. Travelers Ins. Co., 159 Ohio Misc. 2d, 2009-
Ohio-7196, 934 N.E.2d 430. 
 268.  Siuda, 2009 WL 3110817. 
 269.  Id. at *1. 
 270.  Id. at *2. 
 271.  Id.
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 4.   Summary 
 I have reviewed cases in various different subsets of this general 
category. Though summarization is difficult, one conclusion is that, 
overall, the public policy defense appears to be substantially less suc-
cessful when it is not closely linked to law created through the legis-
lative or regulatory process. Occasionally, courts will discern or make 
public policy through analysis that resembles a precedent-driven, 
common law approach. More often, however, it appears that courts 
are most willing to let a contract stand unless an express rule or 
strongly established case law dictates otherwise. 
 This analysis still begs the question: How do we explain the cas-
es—one-third of the public policy defense cases—that appeal to gen-
eral public policy and fail? Perhaps these are the cases that have no 
support—a defense that a party brings as a last resort. 
 This observation may bring some consolation in the form of 
providing a bare modicum of order to the general category. Even if 
these broad unsuccessful cases cannot be explained well or must be 
described as unruly, nearly two-thirds of the cases can be ordered. 
 (a)   “Hybrid” Cases 
 Occasionally, parties in these public policy defense cases seem to 
appeal both to a statutory argument and general public policy argu-
ment, although not many cases seem to fall into this category.272
Even when this happens, the defense often leans heavily in one direc-
tion, which places it outside of the true hybrid category. Sometimes, a 
party will argue down both channels in an effort to be thorough, but 
courts appear to take the pleading in one direction or another. Alt-
hough a brief mention of these “hybrid cases” completes the categori-
cal puzzle, little emerges from these opinions to enhance our under-
standing of the defense. 
 (b)   Testing the Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 178 
 Though the Restatement of Contracts in this area was presented 
in Part II, it is worth briefly revisiting the purpose of the Restate-
ment in order to test whether the purpose has been achieved in the 
public policy defense arena. The American Law Institute declared that: 
The object of the Institute in preparing the Restatement is to pre-
sent an orderly statement of the general common law of the United 
States . . . . 
. . . . 
 272.  In this sample, only five did; drawing conclusions from a sample that small would 
prove fruitless.  
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The object of the Institute is accomplished in so far as the legal 
profession accepts the restatement as prima facie a correct state-
ment of the general law of the United States.273
 The members of the American Law Institute who drafted the Re-
statement of Contracts originally aimed to summarize the common 
law of contracts in treatise form. Eventually, especially in the course 
of drafting the second Restatement, the mission evolved into a sum-
mary that also incorporated prescriptions for what contract law 
should be. The reporter of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, E. 
Allan Farnsworth, wrote an article explaining (or confessing) that 
sections 158 and 272 of the second Restatement were the result of 
“[r]elying on the few cases that have fashioned more imaginative so-
lutions [to govern] cases of mistake, impracticability, and frustra-
tion.”274 The drafters seized upon the cases that they wanted to serve 
as leading cases. 
 The more obvious identified aim of the Restatement, besides 
providing an accurate resource that “restated” the law, was to pro-
vide enough grounding to enable more precise “forecasting [of] the 
outcome of future legal disputes.”275 Practitioners, judges, and the 
legal academy indeed look to the Restatement for “clear-cut state-
ments of rules.”276 However, the purpose of the Restatement of Con-
tracts migrated over time from one of purely attempting to “restate 
the law” (in the drafting of the first Restatement) to that of a hybrid 
of literal “restatement” and aspirational architecture for innovations 
that were developed by the drafters, predictability among the goals.277
 The drafting of the original and second Restatements “provoked 
an enormous body of legal scholarship, with the legal community de-
bating the wisdom and effect of particular restatement rules.”278 In 
fact, section 178 of the Restatement (Second) provides another oppor-
tunity to debate the Restatement’s wisdom. This section is sparsely 
cited in the public policy opinions. Where the public policy defense is 
involved, the “weighing” that section 178 proposes appears not to be 
employed by courts. Balancing of interests in any form seems rarely 
to happen in the determination of whether enforcement of the con-
tract should be void on public policy grounds. The vitality of section 
 273.  RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION: QUASI CONTRACTS AND CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS at 
ix (1937). 
 274.  W. Noel Keyes, The Restatement (Second): Its Misleading Quality and a Proposal 
for its Amelioration, 13 PEPP. L. REV. 23, 32 (1985) (citing E. Allan Farnsworth, Ingredients 
in the Redaction of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 (1981)). 
 275.  Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Common Law as an Iterative Process: A Prelimi-
nary Inquiry, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747, 780 (2006). 
 276.  Shirley S. Abrahamson, Refreshing Institutional Memories: Wisconsin and the 
American Law Institute: The Fairchild Lecture, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1, 6 (1995). 
 277.  Keyes, supra note 274, at 54-55. 
 278.  Abrahamson, supra note 276. 
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178(1) only seems to emerge in practice when read in conjunction 
with section 179(a) (where legislation is involved or invoked.) The 
logic and spirit of Restatement section 181 (licensing) also surfaces in 
action, if not citation, as described in Part IV.A. 
 Only one opinion279 out of 104 in the sample cited to Restatement 
section 178.280 Only four out the 104 opinions in the sample appeared 
to demonstrate any balancing or weighing in the analytical process.281
This speaks to the low impact of the Restatement on the public policy 
defense. Why did the Restatement turn out to be so irrelevant? An 
enlightened assessment of the utility (or lack thereof) of the  
Restatement (Second) of Contracts should begin with the words of 
Professor E. Allan Farnsworth upon the publication of the American 
Law Institute’s work: 
It is . . . of special interest to ask in what respects the Restatement 
(Second) is innovative rather than traditional. To this question 
there is no easy answer. Sometimes innovation does not take the 
form of a new substantive rule but rather of a new perspective on 
the problem, reflected in the substitution of a new terminology or 
analysis for a traditional one. For example, the Restatement (Se-
cond) . . . speaks of promises and other terms that are “unenforcea-
ble on grounds of public policy” and not of “illegal bargains.” There 
is no way to assess the extent to which such innovations in termi-
nology and analysis portend innovations of substance.282
 Professor Farnsworth’s candor, specifically with respect to the in-
novations relating to enforceability on grounds of public policy, in-
vites an assessment of the Restatement. It appears that this particu-
lar innovation in the Restatement (Second) has proven fruitless in 
the public policy area, both as an express source and as a basis for 
innovation in the way the drafters might have envisioned. Put simp-
ly, the Restatement has not proven useful—and this Article empiri-
cally illustrates that conclusion. 
 With all of this examination of the literature, and the close study 
of a tight sample of cases and the Restatement, a stronger basis ex-
ists for measuring up the “unruly horse” metaphor. Enough data is at 
the fingertips now to make some tentative conclusions about the 
 279.  See More Light Investments v. Morgan Stanley DW Inc., No. CV 08-0580-PHX-
MHM, 2009 WL 2382997 (D. Ariz. Aug. 4, 2009). 
 280.  Though the 104 cases are the product of a filtering process for “pure” cases, this 
one case was the citation of Restatement section 178 in the “all cases” database in Westlaw 
during the period of study. 
 281.  The only cases that appear to use this approach were U.S. ex. rel. Head v. Kane
Co., 668 F. Supp. 2d 146 (D. D.C. 2009), Sanchez v. County of San Bernardino, 98 
Cal.Rptr.3d 96 (2009), Alpert, Goldberg, Butler, Norton & Weiss, P.C. v. Quinn, 983 A.2d 
604 (N.J. Super. 2009), and Zakresky v. Grad. Sch. of Figurative Art of N.Y. Acad. of Arts,
899 N.Y.S.2d 64 (Table) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009). 
 282.  E. Allan Farnsworth, Ingredients in the Redaction of the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1981) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
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structure of the public policy defense—where it is “unruly” and where 
it is less so. 
V. HOW UNRULY IS THE PUBLIC POLICY DEFENSE—AND WHAT TO DO
ABOUT IT?
 This analysis of a consistent set of public policy defense cases sug-
gests that an alternative ordering scheme could be developed to en-
hance what was given to us by scholars, commentators, and the Re-
statement.283 My scheme points toward possible solutions for creating 
more certainty and definition through a more robust description of 
the defense. I recognize that a full prescription warrants separate, 
serious treatment and analysis in the fashion that other scholars 
have offered, notably, John Shand.284 I share a potential approach 
here, rooted in some of the broader literature on judicial discretion. 
A.   Separating the Categories of Public Policy Cases 
 As I have detailed throughout this Article, the public policy de-
fense tends to be twice as successful in cases brought with an argu-
ment that relates closely to a statute or regulation. Given that such 
cases account for nearly half of the cases analyzed, this can lead to a 
conclusion that approximately half of the cases are “ruly.” Regardless 
of whether the court voids the agreement, if the defense involves a 
statute or regulation, a clearer path toward a result has been blazed. 
The court does not have to discern public policy or build on case law 
precedent that might have unsound roots. 
 With respect to the other half of cases, a substantial portion of 
them can also be deemed “somewhat ruly” in that they were, at the 
very least, built on previous case law that declared or discerned pub-
lic policy. Though this approach to the defense may constitute the 
construction of a legitimate opinion on top of illegitimate roots, at 
minimum, precedent provides some degree of order. Hans Linde may 
find attaching any “ruly” label to this category problematic, but I as-
sign this “somewhat ruly” label as a matter of degree. 
 The one-third of the cases where the defense appeals broadly to 
public policy (and typically fails) appears to present the most disor-
der and “unruliness.” Most of these opinions present conclusions 
about the defense without much express justification for the failure. 
Perhaps this portion of the cases most closely fits with the “unruly 
horse” metaphor. 
 283.  Arguably, a more complete scheme could also address remedies related to the 
defense. Some scholars have addressed this question, see, for example, Wade, supra note 
18, but it would be a contribution to the literature to tether remedies to the scheme I pro-
vide here.
 284.  See generally Shand, supra note 3. 
616 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:563 
B.   Modest Prescriptions for Addressing These Categories 
 Prescriptions for reordering or simplifying the approach to the 
public policy defense necessarily invoke some of the broader philo-
sophical debate about judicial discretion and theories of adjudication. 
Given this Article’s empirical findings, the logical next step for deep-
er exploration of this topic is some further philosophical development 
of the public policy defense’s underpinnings. Accordingly, below I 
briefly propose an approach toward the public policy defense that is 
anchored in the literature on discretion and positivism. I will do this 
with the caveat that the prescriptive angle of this topic invites an 
analysis and discussion that I only begin to explore here.285
 Henry M. Hart and Albert M. Sacks define discretion as “the pow-
er to choose between two or more courses of action, each of which is 
thought of as permissible.”286 Ronald Dworkin, in turn, offers an ar-
ray of definitions of discretion that he aligns along a “weak” to 
“strong” axis.287 Though Dworkin’s framework has been aggressively 
challenged,288 it proves helpful in framing an understanding of  
how one might begin to clarify our approach toward the public policy  
defense problem.  
 Judges exercise the “weakest” discretion in cases that might be 
defined as “ruly” or “easy”—where the rules and authorities clearly 
point in one direction.289 The first category of public policy cases, those 
that tether the public policy defense tightly to a statute or regulation, 
should be placed, in Dworkin’s ordering, on the weakest side of the  
discretion spectrum. 
 In the second, “somewhat ruly” category of cases, where judges 
discern and declare public policy through the use of case precedent, 
judges seem to be exercising a slightly “stronger” (but probably still 
generally “weak”) discretion. In these cases, judges apply the inter-
pretations of other judges; still basing decisions on an established 
body of law, but leaving more room for discretion in the ultimate out-
come. An extra degree of separation exists between law created 
through the legislative/regulatory process and the instant case. 
Granted, for exclusive positivists like Joseph Raz, who would argue 
that only expressly enacted rules or standards are the only legitimate 
 285.  I thank Norman I. Silber for encouraging me to develop further this part of the 
Article. See generally, Edward L. Rubin, Discretion and its Discontents, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1299, 1300-04 (1997) (discussing and comparing the dominating definitions of discre-
tion in the literature, particularly that of Henry Hart and Albert Sachs to Ronald 
Dworkin). 
 286.  HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS 
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 144 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey 
eds., 1994). See also Rubin, supra note 285, at 1300-04. 
 287.  RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 31-39 (1977). 
 288.  See Rubin, supra note 285, at n.18. 
 289.  See Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1985). 
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sources of law, this exercise of greater discretion beyond the narrow-
er source might prove comparatively more concerning than the previ-
ously discussed set of cases. 290 In this second category, positivists 
would likely find cases based on well-settled uncontroversial prece-
dent to be less troubling than those which rested more heavily on 
“moral or extra-legal judgments.”291
 In contrast, exclusive positivists would be most concerned about 
scenarios where judges are exercising “strong discretion” in the total 
absence of recognized legal sources, as in the third “unruly” category 
of cases, the ones that appeal broadly to public policy without refer-
ence to statute, regulation, or even precedent.292 As Dworkin presents 
it, in these zones of strong discretion, judges would not be bound by 
standards or authority.293 Consistency and conformity of justice 
would be at risk.  
 In this third category, judges simply are declining the invitation to 
exercise discretion, where such discretion may be strongest because 
no pre-ordained written rules of any sort appear to govern or compel 
or even nudge toward a result,. Where there is no written authority 
to support a public policy defense, empirically and anecdotally,  
judges seem to back away from the temptation to attack or undo  
the agreement at issue. They often reach this result without  
offering explanation.  
 Judges tend to shy away from affirmatively invalidating contracts 
where doing so would involve a purely moral imposition on parties 
that freely consented to an otherwise enforceable agreement. The ex-
clusive positivists should be comfortable with the process and out-
come of the vast run of cases in this third category because judges are 
reluctant to stray from preexisting sources of law. The Siuda v. To-
bin case summarized above typifies the judicial approach in this 
category—if the public policy defense lacks “clear roots” in the law, 
judges will not recognize the defense.  
 290.  Joseph Raz distinguished among precedent-based cases in his “sources thesis”: 
 “[T]he law on a question is settled when legally binding sources provide its so-
lution. In such cases, judges are typically said to apply the law, and since it is 
source-based, its application involves technical, legal skills in reasoning from 
those sources and does not call for moral acumen. If a legal question is not an-
swered by standards deriving from legal sources then it lacks a legal answer—
the law on the question is unsettled. In deciding such cases courts inevitably 
break new (legal) ground and their decision develops the law (at least in prece-
dent-based legal systems). Naturally, their decisions in such cases rely partly 
on moral and other extra-legal considerations.” 
JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 49-50 (1979).  
 291.  Id.
 292.  See id.
 293.  Dworkin, supra note 287, at 32. 
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 The question remains, however, about whether a hands-off, exclu-
sive-positivist-themed rule should be the general approach in this 
third category, or whether a more pragmatic approach toward pre-
venting objectively harmful or extremely undesirable outcomes in 
extreme cases could be accommodated. Perhaps the establishment of 
a defined, pragmatic approach would satisfy inclusive positivists 
like H.L.A. Hart, who wrote that “the rule of recognition may incor-
porate as criteria of legal validity conformity with moral principles 
or substantive values.”294  Devising a substantive, values-driven rule 
for handling these cases that broadly appeal to public policy might 
lend more legitimacy to a rare exercise of discretion.  
 Using this theory about discretion, I contend that order can be 
brought to the public policy defense. The first way order can be 
brought would be simply to declare what is happening in the first two 
categories of cases at issue, and formalize that approach in a way 
that the Restatement has not. The second way order can be 
brought is to set a blanket rule that the public policy defense 
should generally fail in the third category. A “safety valve” can be 
created, however, to ensure that in the third category, the court 
can recognize this defense under dramatic circumstances.  
 Next, I conclude with a summary of how the public policy defense 
can be reordered by providing a brief prescription for how courts can 
handle public policy cases in each category. 
 1.   Taming the “Ruly” Horse Where the Defense is Tethered to a 
Statute or Regulation. 
 The first step in taming the horse should be to declare that if 
there is no regulation or statute to invoke, the public policy defense is 
completely unavailable. These are the so-called “easy cases” associat-
ed with weak discretion. This declaration would certainly satisfy the 
concerns mentioned by Hans Linde about the judicial use of public 
policy. It would definitely bring order. 
 If this approach was used by itself, it could lead to some socially 
undesirable and harsh outcomes in instant cases. However, legisla-
tors and regulators could ultimately fix a serious glitch that emerged 
from any such case. Legislators and regulators are expressly charged 
with setting public policy and have a broader set of tools with which 
to develop and craft it. This step alone would draw a brighter line and 
bring order to the defense if courts adopted this approach consistently.295
 294.  H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 250 (2d ed. 1994). 
 295.  Although not much harsher than what some of the licensure and criminal case 
plaintiffs experienced in the cases examined above. 
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 2.   Taming the “Somewhat Ruly” Horse Where Case Precedent  
is Available. 
   This second step in taming the horse should be adopted in conjunc-
tion with the first step. In sum, adopt a blanket rule that the defense 
is unavailable unless a public policy interest has already been  
identified in case precedent, or the legislature or regulators have 
formally spoken through statutes or regulations. This statement, 
which appears to encompass much of what courts appear to be doing, 
would create a degree of order and make the unruly horse tamer.  
The mere declaration of this broader “weak discretion” rule  
would promote more certainty and order than the more complex, but  
unused, Restatement.296
 3.   Taming the “Unruly” Horse Where There are no Rules. 
 The complexity of the public policy problem almost guarantees the 
presence of a significant defect in any solution. One problem that al-
ways must be addressed is the remaining judicial temptation still to 
take to the invitation of a broad public policy defense to prevent a 
severe instant injustice. Dworkin would label this zone as one of  
stronger discretion.  
 The routine yielding to such a temptation would ultimately yield 
uncertainty.297 Perhaps the right approach should be to leave the 
door open just a bit in narrow circumstances for creative acceptance 
of the public policy defense, even if the courts should take a harder 
line generally on accepting the defense. A new approach should pre-
serve a public policy “safety valve,” where, in the absence of a statute 
or regulation, the defense could be limited to scenarios where en-
forcement of a contract would lead to imminent social harm. Declar-
ing the availability of the approach and making it explicit would pro-
vide order, even though it might invite more public policy challenges. 
 Take, for example, a situation where a court confronts a social 
danger emerging from allowing a contract to be enforced. The danger 
emerges not just from the contract in front of the court, but from the 
queue of parties eager to engage in these bargains if the court ren-
ders the contract enforceable. The gestational surrogacy cases298 pro-
vide an illustration for that kind of a scenario. If a court deemed in 
those cases that gestational surrogacy contracts presented a socially 
harmful contractual innovation that the legislative and regulatory 
 296.  This approach concededly leaves some disorder behind with respect to the use of 
judicially-constructed public policy precedent. 
 297.  For a rich discussion of the role of certainty and predictability in this context and 
associated tradeoffs, see Shand, supra note 3, at 164-67. 
 298.  See In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) and Calvert v. Johnson, 851 P.2d 776 
(Cal. 1993). 
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apparatus could not quickly address, a court could justify using a 
public policy defense.  
 This narrow exception may prove important because one can 
speculate that the pace of social and technological innovation may 
present increasingly complex public policy questions. The interests of 
the instant parties should still be of less concern than the stake of 
the public in the interim period before the political system could act.  
 If this exception is kept as a true exception, order can still be pre-
served if courts are disciplined and selective about when to apply it. 
Of course, one must accept once again the aphorism that Chief Jus-
tice Roberts recently repeated: 
Extreme cases often test the bounds of established legal principles. 
There is a cost to yielding to the desire to correct the extreme case, 
rather than adhering to the legal principle. That cost has been 
demonstrated so often that it is captured in a legal aphorism: 
"Hard cases make bad law."299
 Implementing such an escape window must be done with an eye 
toward the Chief Justice’s timeworn observation. Providing a tiny 
window for stronger discretion may invite disorder, but if the rule 
about discretion is formalized, the discretionary issue may be some-
what mitigated because courts would be afforded more legitimacy by 
having this defined guidepost. A framework with a narrow exception 
might also channel those pleading the defense to plead it in a more 
orderly way—and enable courts to address the defense more consist-
ently. These exceptional cases should not create public policy nor 
should their content stand as public policy precedent per se. A bal-
ance must be struck. The exception can create order, but if the prover-
bial exception swallows the rule, the horse may prove more unruly 
than when Judge Burrough first warned of it. 
VI.   CONCLUSION
 Judge Burrough’s declaration that public policy was “a very unru-
ly horse” may have led to the repetition and perpetuation of that con-
ception. I contend that the horse today is not “very unruly”—that dis-
cernable patterns emerge in looking at the common run of cases. 
These patterns have not been studied in any previous academic work, 
but they do present themselves after a careful look along certain di-
mensions. A systematic look at judicial opinions involving the public 
policy defense, rather than a broader theoretical look at leading opin-
ions, can shed different light on the public policy defense and narrow 
the areas of unruliness. 
 299.  Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 899 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissent-
ing).
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 If a simpler, workable approach is applied toward these cases, 
based on a current reality about these cases that has not been cata-
loged, the perception of unruliness can diminish over time, and a 
more elegant jurisprudential approach can emerge. 
622 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:563 
